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Abstract 
Cooperation is a phenomenon that has been widely studied across many different 
disciplines. In the field of computer science, the modularity and robustness of multi-agent 
systems offer significant practical advantages over individual machines. At the same time, agents 
using standard independent reinforcement learning algorithms often fail to achieve long-term, 
cooperative strategies in unstable environments when there are short-term incentives to defect. 
Political philosophy, on the other hand, studies the evolution of cooperation in humans who face 
similar incentives to act individualistically, but nevertheless succeed in forming societies. 
Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan provides the classic analysis of the transition from a pre-social 
State of Nature, where consistent defection results in a constant state of war, to stable political 
community through the institution of an absolute Sovereign. This thesis argues that Hobbes’s 
natural and moral philosophy are strikingly applicable to artificially intelligent agents and aims 
to show that his political solutions are experimentally successful in producing cooperation 
among modified Q-Learning agents. Cooperative play is achieved in a novel Sequential Social 
Dilemma called the Civilization Game, which models the State of Nature by introducing the 
Hobbesian mechanisms of (1) opponent learning awareness and (2) majoritarian voting, leading 
to (3) the establishment of a Sovereign.1  
 
 
 
                                                      
1 The code implementation for this research is openly available at www.github.com/wlong0827/state_of_nature 
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1 
I. Introduction 
Overview 
 The central goal of the field of Artificial Intelligence is to produce fully autonomous 
agents that interact with their environments to learn optimal behaviors, improving over time 
through trial and error. A principled mathematical framework for generating that experience-
driven learning is reinforcement learning (RL) which teaches software agents to take actions in 
an environment so as to maximize some notion of cumulative reward. Incredible strides have 
been taken with recent state-of-the-art RL algorithms like deep Q-networks and asynchronous 
advantage actor-critic that enable intelligent agents to master previously intractable problems2 
including, famously, playing graphical video games3 and beating humans at Go4. But as we 
apply AI to larger and more complex problems like coordinating entire transportation or 
manufacturing infrastructures, it becomes increasingly untenable for a single agent to master an 
entire problem by itself.  
Consequently, multi-agent systems (MAS) is one of the most important frontiers of 
research within the field of AI. Research in this subfield is concerned with how to produce 
desired global properties in “heterogeneous groups of autonomous agents that pursue partially 
conflicting goals in an autonomous fashion.”5 Even when each of a group of agents has identical 
interests – for example, when acting on behalf of a single user or organization – physical or 
computational considerations can make it desirable to have these agents make decisions 
independently.6 With the advent of autonomous vehicles and the explosive growth of software 
                                                      
2 Arulkumaran, K et al. A Brief Survey of Deep Reinforcement Learning. 2017. 1. 
3 Mnih, V et al. Playing Atari with Deep Reinforcement Learning. 2013. 
4 Silver, D et al. Mastering the Game of Go without Human Knowledge. 2017. 
5 Ossowski, S and Serrano, A. Social Coordination among Autonomous Problem-solving Agents. 1998. 134-148. 
6 Groves, T. 1973. Incentives in Teams. 617–631. 
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systems, MAS offer solutions to enable intelligent agents, while pursuing their own objectives 
(e.g. driving a car from point A to B), to interact with other independent agents and humans in a 
shared environment in a way that leads to optimal global behavior (e.g. minimizing total travel 
time) without requiring external coordination.  
When we place RL agents in a MAS setting, however, we get the problem of cooperation. 
Traditional learning algorithms are self-regarding and have only the objective of optimizing their 
behavior so as to maximize their own cumulative reward. So, when placing multiple self-
interested agents in a shared environment, often there is divergence between what is best for the 
individual and what is best for the group. Such scenarios are called social dilemmas and they are 
a matter of interdisciplinary interest from game theory and economics7 to biology8 and 
sociology9. Multi-agent reinforcement learning faces an additional challenge because of the 
unique perception-action-learning feedback loop within which each individual agent operates. 
When the reward received by an agent in a state is a function of not only its action, but the 
actions of other agents beyond its control, it can have difficulty determining the optimal policy to 
follow. As a result, a research area of critical importance focuses on how to overcome these 
obstacles and achieve cooperation in order to make MAS feasible. In the last several decades, 
this field of research has developed “a vast array of techniques for cooperation and collaboration 
as well as for agents to handle adversarial or strategic situations,” but even so, “current 
generation agents are unlikely to meet this new challenge except in very simple situations.”10 
                                                      
7 Curtis Eaton, B. The elementary economics of social dilemmas. 2004. 
8 Ale, S. B. Evolution of Cooperation: Combining Kin Selection and Reciprocal Altruism into Matrix Games with 
Social Dilemmas. 2013. 
9 Kollock, P. Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. 1998. 
10 Grosz, B. A Multi-Agent Systems ‘Turing Challenge’. 2013. 
   
 
 
3 
The field of political philosophy, likewise, is concerned with the cooperation of 
autonomous, self-interested individuals in pursuit of common goods. Human society, or political 
community, is the vehicle by which we achieve these collective goods and, consequently, it is 
said that “society is the complete political good.”11 While we often take the fact of human 
cooperation within the nation-state for granted, political philosophers have long argued about 
whether humans naturally form political communities and which preexists the other. Aristotle 
summarizes one view when he claims that “men journey together with a view to particular 
advantage, and by way of providing some particular thing needed for the purposes of life, and 
similarly the political association seems to have come together originally, and to continue in 
existence, for the sake of the general advantages it brings.”12  
Thomas Hobbes, one of the central modern political philosophers and the father of 
modern liberalism, on the other hand, takes the opposite view. Gauthier summarizes Hobbes’s 
view as claiming that “individual human beings not only can, but must, be understood apart from 
society. The fundamental characteristics of men are not products of their social existence.”13 
Much of modern political philosophy and social contract theory exists in response to Hobbes’ 
ideas about human nature and interaction. His famous contention is that life in the State of 
Nature is so terrible that it is overwhelmingly in the best interest of individuals “to confer all 
their power and strength upon one Man,”14 the Sovereign, whose exclusive and absolute powers 
of retributive punishment finally establish stable human society. Once pre-social man comes to 
realize this necessity, he will desire to subject himself to laws and limitations as long as others 
are also similarly desirous, and when a majority of them come to this agreement, they ratify the 
                                                      
11 Strauss, L. What is Political Philosophy? And other Studies. 1959. 10. 
12 Aristotle, Ethics viii. 9.1160a 
13 Gauthier, David, The Social Contract as Ideology. 138. 
14 Id. at 120. 
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Social Contract and institute the Sovereign. This individualistic train of thinking shaped a strand 
of later political thought as well, which Macpherson labels “possessive individualism,”15 in 
which an individual is conceived as the sole proprietor of his or her skills and owes nothing to 
society for them. 
 While it may be unclear at first sight, the problem of cooperation in the fields of MAS 
and political philosophy overlap in significant ways. Both see a tension between individual and 
collective interests and both are interested in developing practical mechanisms for moving 
individuals away from acting on their short-sighted interests, which we might call defection, 
towards a joint policy of cooperation that’s strictly better for everyone involved in the long-run. 
It stands to reason, then, that the political solutions that seem to have been successful in 
promoting civil society for humans might also be conducive to producing cooperation in MAS. 
Hobbes’s theory of the state is well suited to AI because of the applicability of his theory of 
human nature and the mathematical approach he takes to deducing the formation of the state 
from those foundational assumptions.  
 Given these similarities, I suggest that, to the degree that the mechanisms in Hobbes’s 
political philosophy are actually effective in prompting humans to cooperate, those same 
solutions should be beneficial for teaching MAS to find cooperative policies. The overarching 
objectives of the thesis, therefore, can be listed as follows: 
1) Present an original case for the applicability of Hobbes’ philosophy of human nature and 
moral psychology to AI. 
2) Introduce the Civilization Game, a new Markov game modelled on the Hobbesian State 
of Nature to measure the performance of a MAS composed of RL agents.  
                                                      
15 Macpherson, C. B. The political theory of possessive individualism: Hobbes to Locke. 1962. 
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3) Show that an augmentation of the Civilization Game and standard Q-Learning algorithms 
with Hobbesian political mechanisms with Opponent Learning Awareness, Majoritarian 
Voting, and Sovereign reward-shaping produces a significant improvement in the ability 
of agents to find the long-term cooperative strategy. 
This project applies methodologies from these two disparate fields, AI and political 
philosophy, to synthesize solutions for producing cooperation. This project, beyond its 
immediate research goals, also seeks to motivate further interdisciplinary exploration that draws 
on long-standing philosophical ideas about human nature to inform contemporary work on 
reproducing intelligence in machines. My hope is that the research and solution produced in this 
thesis might offer a compelling instance of such a synthesis. 
 
Cooperation and Game Theory 
Cooperation is a wide-ranging concept that has been studied across many different 
disciplines from economics and social science to evolutionary biology and philosophy. Olson 
famously summarized the central problem by saying that “unless the number of individuals in a 
group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals 
act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interests.”16 Hobbes likewise agreed that men are not like bees and ants for 
whom “the Common good differs not from the Private.”17 Even in evolutionary biology, it seems 
that “Darwinian selection should preclude cooperation from evolving,”18 because of the constant 
drive for individual survival.  
                                                      
16 Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. 2009. 2. 
17 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Tuck, R, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. XVII. 119. 
18 Supra, Ale at 1. 
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Popular consensus had generally been that groups of individuals with common interests 
usually attempt to further those common interests. Groups of individuals with common interests 
are expected to act on behalf of their common interests much as single individuals are expected 
to act on behalf of their personal interests. This opinion about group behavior is frequently found 
in both popular discussions and scholarly work. Such a view has, for example, been important in 
many theories of labor unions, in Marxian theories of class action19, and in concepts of “counter-
vailing power.”20 It also underpins the Madisonian concept of faction built into the American 
political system wherein citizens are supposed to be “united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens”21 in a way that translates 
into policy outcomes. 
Olson’s thesis motivated both the further study of the dynamics of individual behavior in 
collective settings and the concept of the organization which “performs a function when there are 
common or group interests,” although organizations often also serve purely personal, individual 
interests, “their characteristic and primary function is to advance the common interests of groups 
of individuals.”22 The formation and operation of organizations is often far from optimal, 
however, as is shown by “the fact that profit maximizing firms in a perfectly competitive 
industry can act contrary to their interests as a group.”23 In the same way that market pressures 
cause competing companies to produce and sell goods at lower and lower profit margins though 
it is against the interest of each company individually, individuals with aligned common interests 
may fail to realize them in an organization because of competing private interests.  
                                                      
19 Przeworski, A. Capitalism and social democracy. 1985. 
20 Galbraith, J. American capitalism: the concept of countervailing power. 1956. 
21 Hamilton, A. and Madison, J. The federalist papers. X.  
22 Supra, Olson. 
23 Chamberlin, E. Monopolistic Competition. 4. 
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So, then, “if the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal 
welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to 
force them to do so”24 Coercion is ultimately what enables communities to prevent the Tragedy 
of the Commons (e.g. coordinating communal resource use, according to Ostrom25), 
governments to pursue public goods (e.g. taxing citizens to build highways), and, crucially for 
Hobbes’s political system, enables individuals in the State of Nature to enforce contracts with 
one another, for “Covenants, without the Sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a 
man at all.”26 Indeed, we will see that for Hobbes, once a central coercive power has been 
established, the situation individuals face in the State of Nature changes dramatically, and their 
actions become calculated based not on what they think conduces to their self-interest, but what 
the Sovereign knows to be best for the society. 
Game theory offers a powerful, formal setting within which to study the individual vs 
collective tensions that exist within organizations like human society or MAS. Hobbes is often 
said to be the father of game theory since his broader project was to resolve the complex whole 
of political society into simple social interactions. In De Cive, he writes: 
For as in a watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the wheels 
cannot well be known, except it be taken asunder and viewed in parts; so to make a more 
curious search into the rights of states and duties of subjects, it is necessary, I say, not to take 
them asunder, but yet that they be so considered as if they were dissolved; that is, that we 
rightly understand what the quality of human nature is, in what matter it is, in what not, fit to 
                                                      
24 Supra, Olson at 2. 
25 Ostrom, E. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. 1990. 
26 Supra, Leviathan at XVII. 117 
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make up a civil government, and how men must be agreed amongst themselves that intend to 
grow up into a well-grounded state.27 
Hobbes attempts to reduce the whole of human existence in the State of Nature into individual, 
game-theoretic encounters between one individual and another, and by examining these 
encounters, culminate with the Social Contract, which represents the establishment of civil 
government. Depending on what kind of dilemma is faced by pre-social humans, we should see a 
proper objective, function, and scope of the state.  
Skyrms argues that “if one simple game is to be chosen as an exemplar of the central 
problem of the social contract… the most appropriate choice is not the prisoner’s dilemma, but 
rather the stag hunt.”28 The story is first told by Rousseau in 1750: “If it was a matter of hunting 
a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to 
pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it 
without scruple.”29  
The game is formalized into a game-theoretic environment when (1) the hunters each 
have just the choice of hunting the hare or the deer; (2) the deer is much more valuable than the 
hare; (3) the chance of getting the hare is independent of the actions of other hunters and so is 
called the risk-dominant strategy; (4) the chances of getting the deer is directly dependent on the 
number of cooperating hunters but is the payoff-dominant strategy.  
 
 
 
                                                      
27 Hobbes, Thomas. De Cive. II, xiv. 
28 Skyrms, Brian. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. 2004. xii 
29 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, A Discourse on Inequality, III. 
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Figure 1: Matrix game social dilemmas. A cell of X, Y represents a payoff of X for the row player 
and Y for the column player. Each player chooses either to cooperate (C) or defect (D). In the Stag 
Hunt, agents defect out of fear of a non-cooperative partner whereas in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
agents motivated by both fear and greed. 
 
Represented in this way, the stag hunt interaction can be seen in many other places. 
David Hume postulated a similar dilemma in his Treatise on Human Nature: “Two neighbors 
may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because ‘tis easy for them to 
know each other’s mind, and each may perceive that the immediate consequence of failing in his 
part is the abandoning of the whole project. But ‘tis difficult, and indeed impossible, that a 
thousand persons should agree in any such action.”30 Hume observed that cooperation in the stag 
hunt is consistent with rationality, but that the viability of cooperation depends on mutual beliefs 
and trust. Consequently, the Stag Hunt is also referred to equivalently as the Assurance Game. 
Rational agents are pulled in one direction by considerations of mutual benefit and in the other 
by considerations of personal risk.31 For these reasons, the greater the number of players or 
agents in the game, the more difficult it is to achieve cooperation.  
In this way, the problem of cooperation in the State of Nature can be seen as a Stag Hunt 
dilemma between individuals where working together will result in common benefit but 
cooperating when others refuse may lead to personal risk. In the Hobbesian account, then, both 
the State of Nature and the state of society can be called Nash equilibria since it’s always better 
                                                      
30 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Pt II, Section VII, 538. 
31 Supra, Skyrms at 3. 
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to cooperate when others cooperate and to defect when others defect. Thus, formulated in game-
theoretic terms, the fundamental question of both Hobbesian political philosophy and MAS 
cooperation becomes: “how do we get from the hunt-hare equilibrium to the hunt-stag 
equilibrium”?  
 
Multi-agent Systems  
 A multi-agent system is defined as the structure in which multiple agents share a common 
environment, each interacting with every other and having its internal state changed by its own 
actions as well as those of others. An agent can be a physical or virtual entity that can act, 
perceive its environment and communicate with others, is autonomous and has skills to achieve 
its goals and tendencies; even human can be considered components of a MAS32. A MAS 
contains an environment, objects and agents, relations between all the entities, a set of operations 
that can be performed by the entities and the changes of the universe in time due to these 
actions.33 Because each agent has no control over the actions of others and “no global control is 
applied to the participating agents, it has a subjective view of the evolution of the world.”34 Since 
this “evolution” is partly a function of actions beyond any individual agent’s control, we can 
understand why a learning algorithm might find it difficult to converge to long-term cooperative 
behavior since an agent’s action only imperfectly maps to a resulting outcome or reward, 
meaning that it must learn to reason about other agents’ actions and intentions.  
                                                      
32 Mao A et al. Human Computation and Multiagent Systems: An Algorithmic Perspective. 2011. 
33 Ferber, J. Multi-agent systems: an introduction to distributed artificial intelligence. 1999. 
34 Schumacher, M. Objective Coordination in Multi-agent Systems. 2. 
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Figure 2: A typology of cooperation in MAS. The type that is aimed at in this experimental 
setting is emergent cooperation since each agent in the Civilization Game maintains its own 
independent agenda, self-preservation. (Doran et al.)  
Cooperation is “one of the key concepts which differentiates MAS from other related 
disciplines such as distributed computing, object-oriented systems, and expert systems.”35 A 
MAS is independent if each agent pursues its own agenda36 independently of the others. It is 
discrete if it is independent and the agendas of the agents bear no relation to one another; these 
systems involve no cooperation. On the other hand, a system’s behavior is considered emergent 
if it can only be specified using descriptive categories which are not to be used to describe the 
behavior of the constituent components.37 This behavior maintains an intrinsically “subjective 
aspect by directly depending on the cognitive properties of an observer.”38 For example, the puck 
gathering robots of Beckers et al.39 represent an independent system, each following the agenda 
of moving in a straight line till an obstacle is encountered and then changing direction. Puck 
gathering is an emergent behavior of the system in that, from an observer’s viewpoint, the agents 
appear to be working together, but from the agent’s viewpoint they are not. They are simply 
carrying out their own individual behavior. This emergent cooperation is ultimately the objective 
                                                      
35 Doran J. E. et al. On cooperation in multi-agent systems. 1996. 2. 
36 Franklin, S. Is it an Agent, or just a Program?: A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents. 1996 
37 Forrest, S. Emergent Computation: Self-organizing, Collective and Cooperative Phenomena in Natural and 
Artificial Computing Networks. 1990. 42. 
38 Chantemargue, F, Lerena, P and Courant, M. Autonomy-based multi-agent systems: statistical issues. 
39 Beckers, R. From Local Actions to Global Tasks: Stigmergy in Collective Robotics. 1994. 
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being pursued for the MAS playing the Civilization Game, and the relevant benchmark for 
success will be something measurable only at the system level. 
 When MAS find successful strategies for cooperation, “the interactions of individual 
agents possess a value-add compared with each simple agent capability.”40 Specifically, these 
advantages include natural implementations of problems that ask for distributed data and control, 
greater robustness, scalability, and reusability. Looking ahead to an increasingly automated 
future, MAS will also offer a valuable paradigm for human-computer cooperation. 
 
Sequential Social Dilemmas 
Before delving into the agents themselves, we’ll lay out the structure of the environment 
within which they will operate. In order to meaningfully explore the concept of cooperation in 
MAS, agents must face a social dilemma: an environment or scenario which exposes the tension 
between collective and individual rationality. If individual objectives align with the common 
good, then cooperation is achieved trivially. Historically, the theory of repeated general-sum 
matrix games has provided a powerful framework for understanding cooperation through a 
mathematical model of social dilemmas and has produced famous strategies like Tit-for-Tat in 
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.41  
 
 
 
                                                      
40 Nwana, H.S. and Ndumu, D. T. A Perspective on Software Agents Research. 1999. 
41 Rapoport, A. Prisoner’s dilemma-recollections and observations. 1974. 17-34. 
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Figure 3: Outcome variables R, P, S, and T are mapped to the cells of a generic game matrix. 
Incentives are calculated as Fear = P – S and Greed = T – R and games are classified based on 
those incentives that exist in a game. 
 At each stage of the game, there are precisely four possible outcomes: the player will 
receive a reward for mutual cooperation, 𝑅, a punishment arising from mutual defection, 𝑃, a 
“sucker” outcome obtained by the player who cooperates with a defecting partner, 𝑆, and a 
temptation reward achieved by defecting against a cooperating player, 𝑇. A matrix game is a 
social dilemma when its four payoffs satisfy the following social dilemma inequalities42: 
1) 𝑅 >  𝑃. Mutual cooperation is preferred to mutual defection 
2) 𝑅 >  𝑆 . Mutual cooperation is preferred to being exploited by a defector 
3) 2𝑅 >  𝑇 +  𝑆. Mutual cooperation is preferred to an equal probability of unilateral 
cooperation and defection 
4) Either of greed: 𝑇 >  𝑅 or fear: 𝑃 >  𝑆. Mutual defection is preferred over being 
exploited 
These Matrix Game Social Dilemmas (MGSD) have been fruitfully utilized to study a 
wide variety of phenomena and scenarios in social science and biology43, but game-theoretic 
frameworks like the two-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt or other multi-player 
matrix games44 necessarily treat the choice to cooperate or defect as a discrete, atomic action. 
Either a hunter will choose to hunt hare or to hunt stag. In real-world social dilemmas, however, 
                                                      
42 Macy, Michael and Flache, Andreas. Learning dynamics in social dilemmas. 2002. 7229-7236. 
43 Supra, Ale et al. 
44 Broom, M, Cannings, C, and Vickers G. T. Multi-player matrix games. 1997. 931-952. 
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these choices are temporally extended. Cooperativeness is a property that applies to policies not 
elementary actions and consequently exists on a graded spectrum. Decisions to cooperate or 
defect are made with only impartial information about other players’ activities and the state of 
the world.45 A real hunter scouts, tracks, runs, and shoots, but we don’t label these actions as 
intrinsically cooperative or defecting. Rather when we observe the broader policy of observing 
other hunters pursuing the stag and then joining in the chase, we call the hunter’s strategy 
cooperative, and when he chooses the easier route to the hare, disregarding the actions and 
intentions of his fellow hunters, we call it defecting. 
 Recent research in social dilemmas centers around Markov game-based Sequential Social 
Dilemmas (SSD) that treat cooperativeness as “a property that applies to policies, not elementary 
actions” and requires “agents to learn policies that implement their strategic intentions.”46 
Because cooperation and defection are measured through observed behavior and not simply 
through binary choice, they offer the most powerful framework today for measuring true 
cooperation in realistic ways.47 SSDs are a recent innovation on Markov Games that share the 
mixed incentive structure of MGSDs but also require agents to learn policies that implement 
their strategic intentions.  
A Markov game is formally defined, in the two-player case for simplicity, as 𝑀 =
 (𝑆, 𝑂, 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝑇, 𝑟) where 𝑆 is the set of states and 𝑂 is the observation function 𝑂 ∶
𝑆 × {1, 2}  →  ℝ𝑑 specifying each player’s partial 𝑑-dimensional view of the current state of the 
world, 𝐴1and 𝐴2 denoting the two players’ sets of legal actions, a transition function 𝑇 ∶
𝑆 × 𝐴1 × 𝐴2 →  Δ(𝑆) where Δ(𝑆) is the set of discrete probability distributions over the state 
                                                      
45 Leibo, Joel et al. Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas. 2017. 2. 
46 Id at 1. 
47 Kleiman-Weiner, M. et al. Coordinate to cooperate or compete: abstract goals and joint intentions in social 
interaction. 2016. 
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space 𝑆, and the reward function 𝑟𝑖 ∶ 𝑆 × 𝐴1 × 𝐴2  →  ℝ for player 𝑖. If we further let each 
player’s observation function be defined as 𝑂𝑖 = {𝑜𝑖 | 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑜𝑖 = 𝑂(𝑠, 𝑖)}, then to choose 
actions, each player uses a policy 𝜋𝑖 ∶ 𝑂𝑖  →  Δ(𝐴𝑖). Formalized in this way, it becomes apparent 
that matrix games are simply the special case where the state is perfectly observable (𝑂𝑖(𝑠) = 𝑠) 
and the size of the state |𝑆| = 1. In general, we can split the universe of all possible legal policies 
into two disjoint sets of cooperative and defecting policies Π𝐶 and Π𝐷 where there is no 
guarantee that Π𝐶 ∪ Π𝐷 =  Π since for sequential behavior, cooperativeness will usually be a 
graded property. Thus, we define these two sets by thresholding a continuous social behavior 
metric 𝛼 ∶  Π →  ℝ with values 𝛼𝑐 and 𝛼𝑑 such that 𝛼(𝜋) <  𝛼𝑐  ↔  𝜋 ∈  Π
𝐶 and 𝛼(𝜋) >
 𝛼𝑑  ↔  𝜋 ∈  Π
𝐷. This behavior metric will represent our key benchmark for achieving 
cooperation. 
 Formally, we can define an SSD as the tuple (𝑀, Π𝐶 , Π𝐷) when the Markov Game 𝑀 
satisfies the condition that there exist states 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 for which the induced empirical payoff matrix 
satisfies the social dilemma inequalities above. SSD games studied include the Gathering game, 
where players choose between shooting other players which temporarily disables them and 
gathering apples located around a grid-like map, and the Wolfpack game, where players can 
choose to capture prey alone or capture together with other players to obtain an extra bonus.48 
Both these games expose tensions between immediate short-term rewards and optimal 
cooperative behavior that leads to long-term bonuses but requires adjusting one’s policies to 
coordinate with others. I introduce here a new SSD, the Civilization game, that faithfully models 
the dynamics that Hobbes posits in the State of Nature and enables the study of a more complex 
range of incentive structures than previous SSDs. 
                                                      
48 Supra, Leibo et al. 
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Reinforcement Learning 
 Turning now to the mechanics of the agents within a MAS, we see that there are three 
broad approaches to learning: (1) supervised learning where the correct output is provided by a 
teacher during a training phase; (2) un-supervised learning where there is no knowledge of the 
correct output but where it is possible to distinguish equivalence classes in the input itself to 
guide the learning process; and (3) reward-based or reinforcement learning where only a 
feedback is provided by the environment on the utility of the performance. Of these, the theory 
of reinforcement learning provides the most natural framework, deeply rooted in psychological49 
and neuroscientific50 perspectives on animal behavior and how agents can optimize their control 
of an environment. The family of RL algorithms, as a subset of all machine learning algorithms, 
is particularly concerned with how to act in a given environment so as to maximize cumulative 
reward. From this family, the Q-Learning algorithm represents an extremely powerful RL 
technique because it is model-free, meaning it doesn’t require complete knowledge of the 
environment, and consequently well suited to play partially-observable Markov games. 
Q-Learning computes a value for every state and action combination with a function 𝑄 ∶
 𝑆 ×  𝐴 →  ℝ where the magnitude of the Q-value is proportional to the perceived value of 
taking action 𝐴 at state 𝑆. At any state, a QL agent simply looks at the set of all possible actions 
that can be taken and, under the epsilon greedy strategy, chooses with some probability 𝜖 to take 
the action with the highest Q-value and takes a random legal action with probability 1 − 𝜖. This 
strategy enables the agent to both explore the state space by performing actions it wouldn’t 
otherwise take while also exploiting learned experience. It also embodies the classic explore vs 
                                                      
49 Thorndike, E. L. Animal Intelligence: Experimental studies. 1911 
50 Schultz, W., Dayan, P. & Montague, P. R. A neural substrate of prediction and reward. 1997. 1593–1599. 
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exploit trade-off where taking actions that are known from experience to yield rewards may 
prevent an agent from finding global maximums.  
Procedurally, all Q-values are initially assigned a random value before learning begins. 
Then, at every time 𝑡, the agent selects an action 𝑎𝑡 from state 𝑠𝑡 and receives reward 𝑟𝑡 and 
updates the Q-value according to the Bellman update equation: 
𝑄(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡)  ← (1 − 𝛼)𝑄(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) +  𝛼(𝑟𝑡 +  𝛾 ∙  max
𝑎
𝑄(𝑠𝑡+1, 𝑎)) 
The parameter 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] is the learning rate where a value of 𝛼 = 0 means that the agent 
essentially learns nothing, exploiting only previous experience, and a value of 𝛼 = 1 means that 
the agent considers only the most recent experience, ignoring prior knowledge. The discount 
factor 𝛾 ∈ [0,1] determines the importance of future rewards where 𝛾 = 0 makes the agent 
myopic, or short-sighted, by considering only immediate reward, and 𝛾 = 1 will make it strive 
towards future reward. Taken altogether, the update equation describes a simple value iteration 
update ran for a fixed length of time that utilizes a weighted average of old values and new 
information. We will see later how RL and the learning parameters in particular find a parallel in 
Hobbes’ theory of the nature of human perception and decision-making. 
 
Figure 4: The perception-action-learning loop where the action 𝑎𝑡 taken translates directly into 
the reward 𝑟𝑡+1 and new state 𝑠𝑡+1. In a MAS, learning becomes unstable because the reward and 
state are functions of other agents’ actions over which a player has no control. (Sutton and Barto) 
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  For Q-Learning in the multi-agent system setting, the i-th agent stores its own Q-
function 𝑄𝑖 ∶  𝑆 ×  𝐴𝑖 →  ℝ in a Q-value table. The policy for that agent can then be written as: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑠) = {
 argmax
𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑖 
𝑄𝑖(𝑠, 𝑎), 𝑝 =  𝜖
𝑈(𝐴𝑖), 𝑝 =  1 − 𝜖
 
Where 𝑈(𝐴𝑖) denotes a sample of legal actions from the uniform distribution. In independent 
multi-agent reinforcement learning, each agent regards the actions of others simply as part of the 
environment. This independence assumption can be considered an assumption of bounded 
rationality in that agents do no reasoning about other agents’ learning and it represents a major 
obstacle for achieving cooperation in MAS. Some promising work has been done recently to 
make agents aware of opponents’ learning51, and that paradigm will also play an important role 
in implementing a Hobbesian mechanism for achieving cooperation.  
 
Hobbes and Leviathan 
 From what we’ve considered so far, it might not yet be obvious why the political 
philosophy of Hobbes would play an intuitive or valuable role in offering new solutions to the 
problem of cooperation in MAS. Providing some historical and philosophical background on this 
thinker and his unique ideas will hopefully help make the case for their applicability to the 
problem at hand.  
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an English political philosopher writing in a 
tumultuous period of European history. From the French Wars of Religion and the bloody Thirty 
Years’ War to the English Civil War culminating in Cromwell’s Protectorate, the 17th century 
was one characterized by extraordinary instability and savagery. Given this kind of political 
                                                      
51 Foerster, Jakob et al, Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness. 2018 
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turmoil, it is not surprising that Hobbes came to hold a view of human beings as creatures who 
will, if unchecked, inevitably behave violently toward one another. The chief political struggle in 
England during this period was between the Parliamentarians, who advocated the rights of 
Parliament, and the Royalists, who supported King Charles I.  
In particular, Charles’s claim to the right to imprison nobles per special mandatum 
domini reges (by special command of the King) raised the question of whether the King was 
above the Law and could therefore subvert it in order to secure the Commonwealth or whether he 
himself was subject to the Law. Hobbes, seeking to settle this disagreement which was causing 
so much conflict and bloodshed, sided strongly with the King, presenting his famous argument in 
Leviathan that the Sovereign embodied the body politic and consequently exercised complete 
and absolute authority. No entity could behave with a single will and reject its Sovereign; he 
could not be tried and executed by the authority of ‘the people’ as Charles I was. Hobbes’s 
royalist friends in 1640-2 were well satisfied with this argument, for it secured to the king all the 
powers vis-à-vis Parliament which he claimed in those years,52 although they eventually realized 
that those same arguments would go on to support obedience to Cromwell’s republican 
government.53 Hobbes himself was likely a staunch royalist whose radical arguments ended up 
undermining his own monarchist position.54  
Leviathan is both Hobbes’s systematic construction of the social state and consequently, 
it is the work this thesis will build its cooperative mechanism upon. It is also the culmination of 
his metaphysical, moral, and natural philosophy begun in De Cive and Elements of Law, and so 
these two works will primarily form the basis of the argument motivating the application of 
                                                      
52 Supra, Leviathan at xix 
53 Skinner, Q. Conquest and consent: Hobbes and the engagement controversy. Visions of Politics. 2002. 287-307 
54 Hamilton, J. Hobbes the royalist, Hobbes the republican. History of Political Thought. 2009. 411-454. 
   
 
 
20 
Hobbesian political philosophy to Artificial Intelligence. To the degree that his natural and moral 
philosophy is applicable to artificially intelligent agents, the mechanism or process he proposes 
in his political philosophy for the formation of society should in principle be applicable to 
producing cooperation in MAS. Consequently, a substantial portion of this thesis will offer an 
interpretation of his metaphysics and natural and moral philosophy as uniquely fitting for 
artificially intelligent agents, specifically reinforcement learning-based AI. Finally, on the 
strength of that comparison, it will implement Hobbes’s political solutions as modifications to 
standard RL to test in the Civilization Game. 
Before that, understanding Hobbes’s philosophical methodology is important. For 
Hobbes, philosophy is divided into three branches: natural, moral, and political, each of which 
study a different kind of “body”. His natural philosophy is guided by a fundamental belief in 
mechanistic materialism, claiming that the universe is machine-like, and strict determinism, 
acting according to strict scientific laws of cause and effect and being composed exclusively of 
material bodies. Similarly for humans, there is no such thing as soul or spirit; rather, everything 
from our actions, emotions, and states of mind, are series of internal “motions” caused by 
external sensation. This materialism enables Hobbes to attempt a “science of politics”, deriving 
political truths from fundamental, self-evident principles through a logical, almost mathematical, 
methodology. He makes a case for political argumentation based on reason, or “ratiocination”, 
alone, since “the principles of politics consist in the knowledge of the motions of the mind.”55  
As Hampton puts it, “Hobbes characterizes his political argument as a ‘demonstration’ in 
the style of geometry, in which his political conclusions are derived from his psychological 
                                                      
55 Supra, De Corpore at 6.74. 
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theories, which in turn can be derived from his physiological theories of human behavior.”56 In 
his biography of Hobbes, John Aubrey explains the encounter that inspired this radical approach: 
He was... 40 years old before he looked upon geometry; which happened accidentally. Being in a 
gentleman's library..., Euclid's Elements lay open, and 'twas the 47 El. libri I. He read the 
proposition. 'By G—,' said he (he would now and then swear, by way of emphasis), 'this is 
impossible!' So he reads the demonstration of it, which referred him back to such a proposition, 
which proposition he read. That referred him back to another, which he also read. Et sic deinceps, 
that at last was demonstrably convinced of the truth. This made him in love with geometry.57 
Impressed with the incontrovertible conclusions which geometry enabled mathematicians to 
show, Hobbes set his mind to deriving a system of government in a similar fashion. In his mind, 
the serious political problems of his time resulted from disagreements over who had the ultimate 
authority in political and religious affairs.  
Consequently, a purely rational methodology could avert the constant quarrels amongst 
philosophers about the proper structure and scope of government. This system of careful, 
deductive, one might say, mathematical reasoning, seeks to establish definitively the proper 
organization and scope of political society. Beginning with Hobbes’s fundamental premises 
about human nature and the universe, he forms a chain of consequences that passes through 
morality and society before reaching politics. If we can show that Hobbes’s premises in natural 
and moral philosophy hold, then his political prescription for the problem of Cooperation should 
also prove effective.  
It’s worth noting that this rationalist epistemology and materialist metaphysics radically 
contrasted with the Christian Scholastic philosophy of Hobbes’s immediate predecessors and to 
other traditional thinkers like Augustine. Augustine, for example, also defined civitas as "nothing 
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else than a multitude of men bound together by some associating tie,"58 but he emphasized that 
this was insufficient to distinguish civitas from other forms of communal life. It is only when we 
give due consideration to the religious and moral implications of the adjective "earthly," that the 
distinctive traits of the civitas terrena become plain.59  
And, for a modern example, Tocqueville insisted that he would “never admit that men 
form a society by the sole fact that they acknowledge the same leader and obey the same laws; 
there is a society only when men consider a great number of objects in the same way; when they 
have the same opinions on a great number of subjects; when, finally, the same facts give rise 
among them to the same impressions and the same thoughts.”60 Disregarding mores, religion, 
and common culture as superfluous to the formation of political society, Hobbes was freed to 
pursue his geometric proof for the foundation of the state, but arguably lost the characteristics 
that made his subjects uniquely human. But, regardless of whether it represents a compelling 
model for human nature, I will show that his materialist and rationalist framework can apply to a 
class of standard AI methodologies. 
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59 Loetscher, Frederick. St. Augustine’s Conception of the State. 1935. 16-42. 
60 Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America. 598 
   
 
 
23 
II. Methodology 
AI as Hobbesian Man 
The field of Computer Science and specifically its subfield Artificial Intelligence offers a 
unique opportunity for Hobbesian scholarship, because, arguably, the tenets of Hobbes’s natural 
and moral philosophy apply remarkably well to computational intelligent agents. Six core 
propositions, two from his foundational natural philosophy and four from his intermediate 
human or moral philosophy, will enable us to both examine this applicability and understand the 
full geometric logic of Hobbes’s political argument for the necessity of the Sovereign: 
1) Mechanistic Materialism – The universe consists solely of sensible material and motion 
2) Strict Determinism – Action in the universe is entirely determined by material causes 
3) The Moral Vacuum – Humans can/should do whatever is necessary for self-preservation 
4) Rational Self-Interest – Humans are rational and driven by subjective interest 
5) Radical Individualism – Humans should be considered as fundamentally individuals.  
6) Equality of Condition – Humans are essentially equal in mental and physical capacity 
Hobbes’s mechanistic materialism and determinism (the first two propositions) lead him to see 
human nature as characterized by moral subjectivism, rational self-interest, radical 
individualism, and equality of condition, which ultimately serves to prove “by experience known 
to all men and denied by none, to wit, that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except 
they be restrained by some coercive power, every man will dread and distrust each other.”61 I 
shall examine each in turn. 
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Mechanistic Materialism 
For Hobbes, all that exists is physical: “for the Universe, being the aggregate of all 
bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also Body, nor anything properly a Body, that is 
not also part of the Universe.”62 The idea of metaphysical realities like soul or spirit are reducible 
to physical, dispositional, or imaginative phenomena since substances are corporeal by 
definition. “Substance and body signify the same thing and therefore substance incorporeal are 
words, which when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an 
incorporeal body”63 Even God Himself is not what is commonly called Spirit, and when we refer 
to him as such, we do not “signify our opinion of his Nature, but our desire to honor him with 
such names as we conceive most honorable amongst ourselves.”64 In effect, he deflects man’s 
claims about the reality of the supernatural or metaphysical as simply a pious means of 
expressing our intentions and opinions.  
This materialist premise quickly translates into a mechanical interpretation of human 
action: since life “is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part 
within, why may we not say, that all Automata have an artificial life? For what is the Heart, but a 
spring, and the Nerves, but so many strings, and the Joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to 
the whole both, such as was intended by the Artificer?”65 Man is no more than a mechanical 
automaton controlled and impelled by an internal force. And what is that internal force? Mere 
Imagination, simply the impression of some object upon the senses, the “conception remaining, 
and by little and little decaying from and after the act of sense,”66 which he calls “the first 
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64 Id at 271. 
65 Id at Introduction, 9. 
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internal beginning of all Voluntary Motion.” By the movement of the Imagination, “these small 
beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, 
and other visible actions, are commonly called Endeavour” and finally, “this endeavor, when it is 
toward something which causes it, is called Appetite or Desire”67 or their opposite, Aversion. In 
this way, all human desire, and consequent action, is reduced to exclusively material causes 
through a mechanistic operation. It is in this sense that we can call Hobbes’s natural philosophy a 
mechanistic materialist one. 
The implications of this view can be difficult to appreciate in our modern context. 
Hobbes has overturned the traditional teleological view of the universe begun with Aristotle for 
whom “every craft and every investigation, and likewise every action and decision, seems to aim 
at some good” and consequently, the good can be meaningfully defined as “that at which 
everything aims.”68 Instead of seeing natural ends as the impetus of action, Hobbes’s mechanical 
model sees action merely as the result of blind matter and motion. The Platonic and Christian 
conception of the incorporeal soul which balances reason with appetite and spirit is rejected. 
Most pertinently for his political philosophy, Hobbes’s reduction of the motivation of all human 
action to the desires elevates the centrality of “power”, the ability to satisfy or obtain the objects 
of Appetite or avoid the objects of Aversion.69 And thus, his famous assertion in Leviathan that 
“I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of Power after 
power, that ceaseth only in Death.”70  
Hobbes’s mechanistic materialist view of the universe is the aspect of his thought most 
obviously and immediately applicable to AI. Strictly defined, “modern computers are simply 
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Turing machines that operate on an alphabet consisting of the two symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’.”71 A 
Turing machine is simply a mathematical model of computation that defines an abstract machine 
which manipulates symbols on a strip of tape according to a table of rules. As its creator, British 
mathematician Alan Turing, described it, “the machine is supplied with a ‘tape’ (the analogue of 
paper) running through it and divided into sections (called ‘squares’) each capable of bearing a 
‘symbol’.”72 It shuttles the tape back and forth, reading data, making marks on its scratch tape, 
and inspecting the tape for information on what to do next. Turing proved that such a seemingly 
naïve and rudimentary contraption, in fact, could embody every imaginable computational 
operation. Nothing significantly changes when we consider reinforcement learning AI. Every 
intelligent operation for a Q-Learning agent is simply a computation that considers memories of 
the quantified “pleasure” or “pain” of being in some state and a further operation to decide what 
action is best fitted to attain maximal utility. So, then, we can easily see the applicability of 
Hobbesian materialism to AI. 
Strict Determinism 
Mechanistic materialism is also closely related to strict determinism. If every extant body 
and potential cause of motion is perfectly contained within the physical, sensible universe, then 
every subsequent effect or observable motion is reducible to an enumerable set of causes, which 
are themselves the result of observable causes, and so. Consequently, free will is also cast aside 
“because every act of man’s will and every desire and inclination proceedeth from some cause, 
and that from another cause, in a continual chain, they proceed from Necessity.”73 Likewise, if 
we consider that at the root of this chain lies “one first mover, that is, a first and eternal cause of 
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all things, which is that which men mean by the name of God,”74 then we can also understand 
why Hobbes might consider himself a sort of compatibilist instead when he explains that “the 
liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God 
will, and no more, nor less” 75 Now, when we apply this Hobbesian premise of strict determinism 
to human beings, we form a portrait of human cognition as a sole function of a set of past 
experiences: “conception of the future is but a supposition of the same, proceeding from 
remembrance of what is past… And that anything hath power now to produce another thing 
hereafter, we cannot conceive, but by remembrance that it hath produced the like heretofore”76 
The epistemological implications of viewing human learning in such a deterministic way seem to 
preclude the possibility of transcending our mechanical minds and grasping real truth, and indeed 
Hobbes himself comes out and explicitly states that “experience concludes nothing 
universally.”77 Rather, truth, is simply a matter of linguistic convention and “consists in speech 
and not in the things spoken of.”78 Strict Determinism in Hobbesian natural philosophy, far from 
being a marginal and inconsequential tenet, clearly has profound implications upon the nature of 
truth and the capacity for humans to attain it. 
Similarly, “machines, when they operate properly, are not merely law abiding; they are 
embodiments of law.”79 In the same way that materialism implies that every action by a physical 
bodies is a result of a fixed and observable set of physical motion and cause, so for computers, 
the output of any Turing Machine is simply the conclusion of a set of fixed computational 
operations upon an input. “Every effective procedure can be reduced to a series of nothing but 
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commands (i.e. statements of the form ‘do this’ and ‘do that’) interlaced with conditional-branch 
instructions”80 which simply perform different commands based on whether some claim is true. 
For Artificial Intelligence, the details of the computational decision process that determines 
action has been laid out thoroughly above and it is unnecessary to recreate it here.  
Thus, there is a striking similarity between Hobbes account of human perception and 
cognition and the reinforcement learning model. In the same way that Hobbesian man consumes 
sense information about the world and then translates it into “endeavor” by means of an internal 
motion, so it is precisely with AI. And just as Hobbesian man is restricted in his cognition to the 
operation of his imagination which is no more than shadows and memories of past experience, so 
reinforcement learning, by definition, draws up its actions solely from the outcomes of previous 
interactions with its environment in order to find the optimal policy of action that results in the 
obtainment of reward and the avoidance of punishment.  
There is, however, one potential deviation from the deterministic nature of that process: 
the introduction of stochasticity, or randomness, that enables agents to occasionally explore new 
states that their decision process would otherwise avoid. The conditional comparison of a 
random number and the exploration parameter  in an epsilon-greedy learning strategy 
determines whether the agent will decide their action based on what has been historically 
desirable (exploitation) or without factoring in any past experience (exploration). The question of 
whether true randomness is deterministic is an exceedingly difficult one for which there is no 
clear consensus amongst philosophers or physicists.  
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Moral Subjectivism 
Having examined the nature and role of materialism and determinism, we now turn to its 
effects on Hobbes’s moral philosophy. How are humans living in a Hobbesian universe supposed 
to behave? What injunctions exist in the State of Nature? What are the prerogatives and 
limitations in such a state?  
The first and most natural consequence is moral subjectivity. In precisely the same way 
that truth is simply a matter of usage and the combination of words into definitions, so “these 
words of Good, Evil, and Contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, 
there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common Rule of Good and Evil to be 
taken from the nature of the objects themselves.”81 Having dispensed with Aristotle’s 
teleological model of the universe by assuming a materialist framework, Hobbes destroys any 
independent conception of the Good by precluding metaphysics and then removing the 
possibility of deriving it from natural ends.  
The Laws of Nature that he proposes in Leviathan are simply rules discovered by reason 
for best maintaining one’s self-preservation that are binding in foro interno, or within one’s own 
thinking and intentions, but not in foro externo, or the actual performance in practice. For 
example, while all men must strive for peace internally, that doesn’t necessarily obligate you to 
work towards it. "For he that should be modest and tractable, and preform all he promises, in 
such time and place where no man else should do, should be make himself prey to others and 
procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature, which tend to nature's 
preservation."82  
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This is quite different from what we might normally associate with conscience or natural 
law, which is both objective, existing independently of one’s own conceptions, and binding on 
external activity. What results, then, is a moral vacuum in the State of Nature with no source of 
authority or judgment to restrain human action. And so, in the “war of every man against every 
man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, 
Justice and Injustice have there no place.”83 With these premises securely in place, Hobbes 
secures himself from the charge that his proposed state of war is prohibited by human conscience 
and the natural law, since what actually exists are only reason, power, and appetite.  
Computers, too, have no equivalent to conscience or natural law traditionally understood. 
This is perhaps one of the strongest reasons for interpreting AI in Hobbesian terms. In many 
other systems of natural and moral philosophy, from the Platonic and Aristotelian to the 
Thomistic, writers assert the existence of both body and soul in humans and that there is an 
imprint of the Law of God “written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and 
their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them.”84 Obviously, such a picture of human 
nature would be entirely unfit to be modelled by a machine (at least in the existing state of 
Computer Science), but the mechanistic and deterministic Hobbesian system, by throwing away 
the concept of natural morality, clears the way for the comparison.  
The incapacity of AI to navigate questions of morality is a subject of significant scholarly 
and policy interest.85 With the advent of autonomous agents driving cars, determining terms of 
parole, and fighting wars, policymakers must grapple with “the capacity of algorithms or trained 
systems to reflect human values such as fairness, accountability, and transparency.”86 The 
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Hobbesian political system offers a framework for achieving cooperation in multi-agent social 
dilemmas even without reference to something like moral reasoning.  
Rational Self-Interest 
From the moral vacuum of the State of Nature, follows the primacy of rational self-
interest in human action. This Hobbes calls “the Right of Nature, which writers commonly call 
Jus Naturale, the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the 
preservation of his own Nature… and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own 
Judgment and Reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto”87 Because Law and 
Right are opposed, with the complete absence of law, natural or civil, in the State of Nature 
comes the monopoly of right in determining human action.  
While it may seem that certain ethical norms like prohibitions upon the murdering of the 
innocent, for example, may be universally held, Hobbes rejects any intrinsic metaphysical 
consideration separate from Reason and self-interest. In fact, for him, the variance in these norms 
across culture and time is greater than the similarity; since a “common standard of virtues and 
vices,” Hobbes says, “does not appear except in civil life; this standard cannot, for this reason, be 
other than the laws of each and every state.”88 Instead, humans always can and do pursue their 
self-interest, subjectively defined as that which satisfies their Appetites and removes their 
Aversions, which in the vast majority of cases (with a few notable exceptions) includes self-
preservation.  
In this sense, Hobbes falls under the category of what contemporary philosophers might 
term behavioralism. In place of the prescriptive traditional natural law of Aristotle and Aquinas 
he substitutes new Laws of Nature derived purely from reason upon the sole premise self-interest 
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which counsel among other things the pursuit of peace, the performance of covenants, and 
gratitude for benefits rendered, all rationally calculated to achieve one’s self-interest. By freeing 
man from all the constraints of traditional ethical norms, natural law, and conscience, Hobbes 
removes any factors from the State of Nature that would have been outside the scope of his 
geometric and deductive methodology. Most importantly, the absence of objective Justice to 
arbitrate human interaction and check each man’s self-interest in the State of Nature allows 
Hobbes to paint it as a state of complete license to invade a neighbor’s territory or renege on 
one’s vows, leading ultimately to continual fear and reprisal. 
The decision process for AI agents takes as input the current state of the world (e.g. my 
location relative to other agents, how much territory I occupy, whether I’ve been invaded by 
another, etc.) and compares it to the “memory” of past experience taking action in that state. In 
the standard case where the agent’s objective function is to maximize its own reward, it 
considers only that single factor when choosing which action to take from a given state. Just as 
for Hobbesian man, then, rational self-interest generally represents the exclusive principle of 
action for AI. My decision to invade my neighbor’s land and thereby inflict injury upon him is a 
calculation made solely with a view towards what I consider is best for me and not informed by 
anything like Sympathy or Justice. If I choose not to invade, it must only be because I expect 
either that he will invade me in retaliation or that I expect for some other reason to receive 
greater long-term benefit for taking a peaceful policy. In the primacy of rational self-interest, 
then, we also see the close applicability of the Hobbesian moral framework to computer 
intelligence. 
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Equality and Individualism 
Finally, this leads us to consider the radical individualism and equality of physical and 
mental condition that characterizes humans in the State of Nature. The two premises are closely 
related and represent a dramatic reversal of the traditional understanding of human nature.  
Hobbes sees man as fundamentally isolated from family and society as well as conflict-
prone, not least because of the differing appellations of words which causes misunderstanding. 
Contrast this with Aristotle who held that “man is by nature a social animal” and so “society is 
something that precedes the individual.”89 Hobbes’s Ninth Law of Nature prohibits Pride and 
obliges “every man to acknowledge the other for his Equal by Nature”90 since, unless men were 
equal, they would never enter into mutual Peace, but would find that the self-interest of the 
strong would be to dominate their inferiors. At the same time, because “the difference between 
man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any 
benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he,”91 there is a consequent mistrust or 
“diffidence” about the intentions of others. If I declare a certain plot of land to be my property, I 
will immediately suspect my neighbors, who are my equals in strength and ambition, of making 
designs upon it.  
The connection with Hobbes’s individualism is most strikingly observed in his view of 
the family within which “there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the 
man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War.”92 By positing the 
equivalence of the father and mother, he destroys the natural paternal authority associated with 
the father in the family. And so also with children, that authority “is not so derived from the 
                                                      
89 Aristotle, Politics. 1253a. 
90 Supra, Leviathan at XV. 107. 
91 Id at XIV. 87. 
92 Id at XX. 139. 
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Generation, as if therefore the parent had Dominion over his child because he begat him, but 
from the child’s Consent.”93 Rather than admitting the existence of some natural authority 
separate from the political, Hobbes claims that the dominion of a father over his children is of the 
same sort of that of the Sovereign over his citizens: a covenant entered into by consent in order 
to achieve self-preservation. This has the further effect of breaking the natural familial ties that 
would otherwise enable each member of the family to rely on every other member for support 
and protection. Equality thus begets individualism and both, in turn, make the State of Nature 
one of isolation, distrust, and paranoia. 
That equality and individualism apply equally to AI, is very plausible. In some MAS, we 
can imagine agents that are completely equal in cognitive and active capacities. In a given 
experimental setup, every “instance” of a learning agent can be the result of the same code and 
thus share precisely the same decision processes, set of potential actions, and motivating 
principle. The only thing separating each agent would be the set of lived experiences unique to it 
and the accidents of chance and position that may cause individual deviances in observed 
behavior. And while individualism does not follow from equality of condition for AIs as it does 
for the Hobbesian man, it applies just the same, but for different reasons.  
Intelligent agents have no concept of the family or natural authority that Hobbes goes to 
such lengths to deny for humans. Whereas one might reasonably consider that a father has a 
natural tendency to protect and provide for his child in the State of Nature, no such relation exists 
amongst agents in a MAS except by convention. For agents that behave in a rational, self-
interested way, any tendency towards cooperation and mutual support that arises is calculated to 
achieve that ideal of individual self-preservation which Hobbes places at the foundation of every 
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relation of dominion between father and child, father and mother, and citizen and Sovereign. Just 
as the premises of equality and independence produce distrust and violence in humans, so they 
may also potentially turn out to be a cause of defecting behavior in multi-agent systems. If this is 
the case, we should expect to see improvements in cooperation with the introduction of an agent 
with dramatically superior power to dominate or reward and thus shape the behavior of other 
agents (roughly a picture of natural authority). 
In summary, I have shown how, starting from Hobbes’s materialist and determinist 
natural philosophy, he incrementally deduces the moral subjectivism, rational self-interest, 
radical individualism, and equality of condition that constitutes the human condition. 
Furthermore, I’ve correlated each premise with his infamous conclusion that the State of Nature 
is a state of “continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.”94 By drawing out the causal links in his deductive methodology, we clearly 
see that for subsequent philosophers to avoid his political conclusions, they must either reject his 
foundational assumption about a material and deterministic universe or else uncover a flaw in 
any of the four succeeding moral philosophical premises. Since these properties have been 
shown to be applicable to the standard form of AI methodology (with agents adopting a rational, 
self-interested viewpoint), we should reasonably expect to find Hobbes’s description of a brutal 
State of Nature and his political prescription, the Sovereign, to be important components of the 
problem and solution for cooperation in MAS. 
 
 
 
                                                      
94 Supra, Leviathan at XIV. 89. 
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The State of War 
From the preceding model of human nature, Hobbes goes on to show that the state of pre-
social man is a state of war where all involved lose out. In this, it is notable that he stands apart 
from other social contractarians like Locke and Rousseau who paint the State of Nature in almost 
idyllic tones preferable to their 18th century political societies. It is arguably the case that, for AI 
in social dilemmas like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the consequences of the cycle of defection make 
it far closer to the Hobbesian prediction. Consequently, there should be great interest in 
understanding his particular political solution, and before that, his diagnosis for why the State of 
Nature is a state of war and how it follows from human nature. 
Hobbes begins by distancing himself from a long-standing strand of thinking about 
cooperation and human nature: “It is true that certain living creatures such as bees and ants, live 
sociably with one another (… by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures), … and 
therefore some man may perhaps desire to know why mankind may not do the same.”95 For 
animals, the “social contract” is written into the very chromosomes of their cells; rationality is 
clearly not necessary for the emergence of cooperation. Hobbes believed, however, that not only 
was it unnecessary, but rational self-interest was the very source of the problem since “the 
agreement of these creatures is natural; but that of men is by covenant only, which is artificial.”96 
Humans do not naturally work together and furthermore, “the difference between man, 
and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to 
which another may not pretend, as well as he.” The result of equality of condition is diffidence, 
or distrust, amongst men, since “if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they 
cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, endeavor to destroy, or 
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subdue one another.”97 Faced with this position of vulnerability with respect to his fellow men, 
each man inevitably pursues the rational policy of pre-emptive invasion. Owing to the high 
potential for conflict in the State of Nature, rational individuals recognize that striking first in 
their struggle for life provides them with the necessary advantage to survive. Consequently, the 
State of Nature can be called a state of war and “Force and Fraud are in war, the two Cardinal 
virtues.”98 Propositions 3 and 5 make these seeming vices morally justifiable since each man has 
the Right of Nature “to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own 
Nature; that is to say, of his own Life.”99 
Of course, when everyone has a Right of Nature to seize whatever it is in one’s power to 
obtain, human wellbeing is fleeting and building civilization is impossible. “In such condition, 
there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain”100 So then, if others are 
willing to lay down this right to achieve security, then the rational policy is always to seek peace 
as well. “But if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason 
for anyone, to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to Prey, rather than to 
dispose himself to Peace.”101 But after enough experience of the state of war, there may come a 
point where a majority of individuals decide that they would rather submit to any authority or 
limitation on their power than go on any longer in that state. When such a plurality of agreement 
has been reached, each man, by “the mutual transferring of Right… which men call Contract,”102 
enacts what we call the Social Contract. 
                                                      
97 Id at 87. 
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Now, once enacted, what is necessary is the performance of the obligations of that 
contract “without which Covenants are in vain and but empty words; and the right of all men to 
all things remaining, we are still in the condition of War.”103 Hobbes finally introduces the role 
of the Sovereign, explaining that “there must be some coercive Power, to compel men equally to 
the performance of their Covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit 
they expect by the breach of their Covenant.”104 Only a figure with absolute and unquestionable 
authority could possibly coerce unscrupulous, opportunistic men to perform their contracts with 
one another. By “conferring all their power and strength upon one man” in an act which “is more 
than Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unity of them all,” political society is finally established. 
The Commonwealth culminates in “one Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual 
Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use 
the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common 
Defense.”105  
From his model of human nature, Hobbes has produced a political argument for the state 
of war based on several key underlying factors: the inherent distrust that each agent has for the 
other, the consensus of a majority to limit their own rights in order to escape this plight, and 
subsequently, the necessity of an authority vested with the power to reward and punish agents in 
a way that makes them amenable to living in society. These are the three core components that 
comprise the force of Hobbes’s solution. 
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The Civilization Game 
The Civilization Game is a game that mimics the agrarian conditions of pre-social 
humanity and represents an experimental model of the experience of primitive man in the 
Hobbesian State of Nature. Players move to acquire territory, farm rewards from existing 
territory, or invade other player’s territory to loot their rewards. Long-term cooperative behavior 
(i.e. farming rather than invading) leads to overall higher cumulative rewards for all players, 
while defecting behavior leads to higher short-run rewards from invading, but lower long-run 
rewards since being invaded in turn incurs a much larger penalty. The game is turn-based and 
agents navigate a 2-dimensional grid-world, moving in the four cardinal directions. These actions 
translate into two broad categories of action, farming one’s own land or invading others’, that 
represent cooperation and defection, respectively. As they traverse the grid world, they acquire 
“territory” by labelling each square they occupy with their unique player ID. In order to mimic 
the incentives that exist in the State of Nature, an “invasion bonus,” a positive reward given to 
the agent who has invaded another agent’s territory, and an “invasion penalty,” a negative fine 
levied on the agent who has been invaded, are instituted. Choosing to farm, meanwhile, produces 
a reward for the agent proportional to the amount of territory it owns on its turn (i.e. one point 
for each square held).  
This setup captures the fundamental dynamics that Hobbes posits in the State of Nature. 
Man is isolated and self-sufficient, and, left to his own devices, can secure a reasonable 
subsistence for himself by farming his property. Once he finds himself in the company of 
neighbors and subject to a scarcity of resources, however, a social dilemma rapidly develops: “it 
comes to pass, that where an Invader hath no more to fear, than another man’s single power; if 
one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come 
   
 
 
40 
prepared with forces united, to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but 
also of his life or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.”106  
Greed emerges as the incentive to invade others’ territory, both because of the immediate 
ability to steal their goods, but also because of the expansion of one’s own territory leads to more 
farming rewards each turn. Fear, also, is the incentive not to be invaded by another, for the same 
two reasons; it is also the incentive that is completely essential for Hobbes since the prospect of 
invasion or death is far more painful than the profits of invasion are pleasant. To reflect this, the 
invasion penalty is greater in magnitude than the invasion bonus. 
 
Figure 5: The Civilization Game with b = 4 and p = 2. Player i = 0 has name 𝑃0 = 𝑃0 and Player 
𝑖 = 1 has name 𝑃1 = 𝑃1. On his move 𝑚 = 1, if 𝑃1 takes action 𝑎 = 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡, then he has invaded 
𝑃0’s territory. 𝑃1 will then gain a 25-point invasion bonus in addition to an 8-point farming 
reward and set 𝑛𝑡+1
1 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 to indicate that 𝑃0 should incur a -10-invasion penalty on 𝑚 = 0. 
In practice, the grid-world is square sized (e.g. a 4x4 grid with 16 squares) and holds up 
to four agents, initially placed at the corners of the grid. Formally, for every moment in game 
time 𝑡 ∈ [0, 1, 2,…𝑇], where we end the game after 𝑇 steps, the state is given by 𝑠𝑡 ∈ 𝑆, where 𝑆 
is the set of all possible states, the action taken is 𝑎𝑡 ∈ 𝐴(𝑠𝑡), where 𝐴(𝑠𝑡) gives the set of all 
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legal actions available in state 𝑠𝑡, and the subsequent reward is some real number 𝑟𝑡 ∈  ℝ. For an 
instance of the Civilization Game with board size, 𝑏, and number of players, 𝑝, any state 𝑠𝑡 can 
be represented as a single vector consisting of three components: 
𝑠𝑡 =  〈?⃑?𝑡 , ?⃑⃑?𝑡 , 𝑚𝑡〉 
The vector ?⃑?𝑡 represents the 𝑏 × 𝑏 grid-world board, with each location containing either a 
player or a player’s territory. ?⃑⃑?𝑡 stores information about whether each player has been invaded 
in an array of booleans of size 𝑝 where the 𝑖th entry represents whether player 𝑖 has been invaded 
by another player since its last move. 𝑚𝑡 ∈ [0, 1,… , 𝑝 − 1] is an integer that tracks which 
player’s move it is at time 𝑡 such that on move 𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚, player 𝑖 = 𝑚 takes an action. Player 
names that are placed in the locations of players in the board are stored in an array ?⃑? of size 𝑝 
(e.g. [𝑃0, 𝑃1,… 𝑃3] for a game with four players), and if a location on a board is the territory of 
player 𝑖 ∈ [0, 1, … 𝑝], then we simply place the integer 𝑖 at that location. So, in total, with a 
representation consisting of (1) a 𝑏 × 𝑏 board with each player appearing once, (2) a 𝑝 sized 
array tracking invasions, and (3) a single byte storing the current move, there are  
𝑏2!
(𝑏2 − 𝑝)!
 ×  𝑏𝑝(𝑏 − 1) ×  2𝑝 ×  𝑝 
possible legal states. For a game with a 3x3 board with 2 players, this translates into |𝑆| =
6,912 possible states, but with a 4x4 board and 4 players, the state size balloons to |𝑆| =
67,092,480 states. 
 The possible actions are any of the four cardinal directions, or if none are legally 
available, then the agent can choose to stay in its current location. Formally, 𝑎 ∈
[𝑢𝑝, 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛, 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡, 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦], and in a given time 𝑡 and state 𝑠, we have 𝑎𝑡 ∈ 𝐴(𝑠𝑡) where 𝐴(𝑠𝑡) 
returns the legal actions for player 𝑖 = 𝑠𝑡,𝑚 that meet two criteria: (1) taking action 𝑎 will not 
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cause the agent to move out of the boundaries of the board, and (2) taking action 𝑎 will not cause 
the agent to move onto the location of another player. Because there are 𝑝 players in the 
Civilization Game, at each time 𝑡, the collective actions for each player are stored in an action 
array ?⃑?𝑡 = 〈𝑎𝑡
0, 𝑎𝑡
1, … , 𝑎𝑡
𝑝−1〉. Importantly, the game is also asynchronous, or turn-based. So, 
while ?⃑?𝑡 contains an action for each player at every time 𝑡 for ease of notation, only the action 
for player 𝑖 = 𝑚𝑡 actually executes at time 𝑡.  
Traditionally, most standard MAS methodology utilizes a synchronous model where 
“agents repeatedly and simultaneously take action, which leads them from their previous state to 
a new one,” but a problem in defining the transition functions of agents arises “due to the fact 
that the state in which the agent ends up after taking a particular action at a particular state 
depends also on actions and states of other agents.” There are two standard ways to address this 
problem: we can “think of the transition function of the entire system, a mapping from the states 
and actions of all agents to the new states of all agents” or else we have to “define the transition 
function of each agent independently, and account for the effects of other agents by making the 
function nondeterministic.”107 Instead of taking either of these routes, agents play the 
Civilization Game in an asynchronous, turn-based way that allows the transition function to 
remain deterministic. 
We define that transition function 𝑇(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) as follows: (1) take the single action 𝑎𝑡
𝑖  for 
player 𝑖 =  𝑠𝑡,𝑚 from location 𝑙 = 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋(?⃑?𝑡 , 𝑃𝑖), (2) move the player from position 𝑏𝑡
𝑙  to a new 
location 𝑙′ = 𝑀𝑂𝑉𝐸(𝑏𝑡
𝑙 , 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑖) defined by: 
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𝑀𝑂𝑉𝐸(?⃑?𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑖) =  
{
 
 
 
 
𝑙 − 𝑏 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑢𝑝
     𝑙 + 𝑏 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛
 𝑙 − 1 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡
   𝑙 + 1 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
 𝑙         𝑎𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦
 
And setting 𝑏𝑡+1
𝑙′ = 𝑃𝑖 (3) if another player’s territory was in the location moved to, or 𝑏𝑡+1
𝑙′ ∈
[0, 1, …𝑝] − [𝑖], then set that player’s invaded state to be True by setting 𝑛𝑡+1
𝑖′ =  𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 for 
player 𝑖′ = 𝑃𝑏𝑡+1𝑙
, (4) set the previous location to be the player’s territory 𝑏𝑡+1
𝑙′ = 𝑖 unless 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 =
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦, (5) if player 𝑖 was invaded, or 𝑛𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒, then reset it to 𝑛𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒, and finally, (6) 
increment the move to the next player’s turn 𝑚𝑡+1 = (𝑚𝑡 + 1) % (𝑝 − 1).  Notice that we 
assume that 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴(𝑠𝑡) is taken from the set of legal actions available to agent 𝑖 at time 𝑡 so that 
we preclude the possibility of moving to a location outside the board or onto the same location as 
another player. 
 The reward a player receives on its turn in the Civilization Game is determined by three 
factors: the amount of territory the agent controls and can farm, the invasion bonus accrued if it 
invades its neighbor’s territory (i.e. gains +10 points), and the invasion penalty if the agent was 
invaded itself by another player (i.e. loses -25 points if 𝑛𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒). Formally, for player 𝑖 we 
can write the reward function as: 
𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) =  {
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑏) + 10 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑏, 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑖) − 25 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑛) 𝑠𝑡,𝑚 = 𝑖
                                                       0                                                          𝑠𝑡,𝑚 ≠ 𝑖
 
where the amount of territory is calculated by 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖(?⃑?𝑡) = 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇(?⃑?𝑡 , 𝑖), whether the player 
has invaded another player’s territory is calculated by: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖(?⃑?𝑡 , 𝑎, 𝑖) =  {
1           𝑏𝑡
𝑙′ ∈ [0, 1,…  𝑝] − [𝑖]
  0                     𝑜/𝑤                       
 
And whether the player has been invaded is determined by  
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𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖(?⃑⃑?𝑡) =  {
 1   𝑛𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒
  0  𝑛𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒
 
Note that, defined in this way, the Civilization Game satisfies the Markov property since the 
deterministic transition from any state-action pair 𝑇: 𝑆 × 𝐴 → 𝑆′ does not depend upon prior 
states. Furthermore, it satisfies the definition of a Markov game 𝑀 =  (𝑆, 𝑂, 𝐴, 𝑇, 𝑟) with a 
perfectly transparent observation function 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑡) = 𝑠𝑡 and a reward function 𝑟: 𝑆 × 𝐴 → ℝ. 
Because of the incentives for both greed and fear, the Game also contains an embedded Matrix 
Game Social Dilemma, but this must be proved experimentally by observing the long-term 
payoffs achieved by actual agent gameplay. 
 
Hobbesian Q-Learning 
As I have already described, Q-Learning is a model-free reinforcement learning 
algorithm whose goal is to learn a policy that determines which actions to take under what 
circumstances. Normally, Q-Learning converges to an optimal policy when playing a finite 
Markov Decision Process,108 but in non-stationary environments like the Civilization Game 
where other actors can interfere with state transitions and rewards, it generally can’t distinguish 
between the effects caused by its actions and those caused by external forces, and consequently, 
fails to converge. In these types of unstable environments, there is no general theory for the 
performance of Q-Learning. In general-sum games there can be multiple equilibria and thus 
initial conditions can alter the long-run payoffs that an agent and others involved can earn. 
Consequently, in some classes of games, many different kinds of dynamics can converge on 
equilibria with low payoffs even though high payoff equilibria exist.109  
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The Civilization game represents an example of a game where a policy of invading offers 
high immediate incentives but results in negative long-run reward while a policy of farming may 
produce low rewards but leads to a positive long-run score. In a 4x4 grid world and 4 Q-Learning 
agents with the following value iteration update parameters: the discount factor 𝛾 = 0.99, the 
soft update parameter 𝑎 = 0.5, and the annealing discovery parameter 𝜀 = 0.1, we observe that 
agents don’t converge to a high payoff cooperative strategy (i.e. avoiding invasion in favor of 
farming, which leads to positive long-term rewards). Rather the learning agents hardly out-
perform agents that behave purely randomly, thus invading one another regularly, and any 
improvements in score are sporadic and temporary. 
 
Figure 6: Collective scores of 4 Q-Learning agents playing on a 4x4 board versus collective 
scores of 4 Random agents. Collective score sums all players’ rewards earned in a 𝑏𝑖𝑛 = 2.5𝑘 
game step period and divides by 𝑏𝑖𝑛 to get a time average. Error bars are the max and min values 
from 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 3 runs while the line represents the median scores. 
From the Hobbesian game-theoretic perspective, Moehler succinctly summarizes this problem in 
the following way: 
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If a situation of social interaction among rational individuals, who behave as if they were to 
maximize their expected utility, has the form of a one-shot PD game, cooperation does not take 
place, assuming common knowledge of rationality and complete information. Rational individuals 
alone are not able to realize the possible gains of cooperation in a one-shot PD game. Instead, they 
end up with a suboptimal outcome, both individually and collectively. To realize the (collectively) 
optimal outcome, an external authority, such as the state, is needed to transform the one-shot PD 
game into another game that makes mutual cooperation rational.110 
In order to remedy this fundamental issue, we need to introduce additional social mechanisms 
that equip Q-Learning players with means of learning and interacting with other players in the 
game. Making learning agents social by implementing Hobbesian mechanisms for producing 
cooperation in MAS avoids explicitly requiring either a single programmer to coordinate and 
control all agents or, in the other extreme, allowing agents to behave in an unconstrained manner 
and appealing to a supervisor for resolving conflicts.111 We call a learning agent with the basic 
Q-learning framework, but equipped with the Hobbesian mechanisms of 1) Opponent Learning 
Awareness, 2) Majoritarian Voting, and 3) Sovereign Reward-shaping, a Hobbesian Q-learner or 
HQ-learner. 
Opponent Learning Awareness 
The three following social mechanisms introduced closely follow the Hobbesian account 
of the formation of political society from the state of consistent defection that learning agents 
find themselves stuck in. The low payoff equilibrium of defection is, as Hobbes would call it, a 
state of war that “consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto,”112 
transitions in his view to a situation in which each player is “willing, when others are so too, as 
                                                      
110 Moehler, M. Why Hobbes’ State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game. 2009. 297. 
111 Supra, Shoham at 232. 
112 Id at XIII. 88. 
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far-forth, as for Peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to 
all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men 
against himself.”113 The problem facing an agent who would like to stop invading and being 
invaded, leading to negative rewards, is that as soon as he “lays down his arms,” another agent 
has an incentive to invade him for short-term gain. “Rational individuals recognize, according to 
Hobbes, that striking first in their struggle for life provides them with the necessary advantage to 
survive in the State of Nature.”114 The Hobbesian term for this phenomenon is Diffidence, or the 
distrust of other player’s intentions, and plays a central role in the unattainability of cooperation 
for him. This is also why Moehler calls the Hobbesian State of Nature an Assurance game and 
considers the primary role of the Sovereign to be one of eliminating Diffidence and 
institutionalizing social trust. “In order for rational individuals to leave the State of Nature, and 
in this sense to cooperate with each other, the Sovereign does not have to change the structure of 
the game that rational individuals play in Hobbes’ State of Nature… Instead, the Sovereign only 
must assure the individuals that if they lay down their rights to everything and agree to keep their 
contracts, all other individuals will do so, too. The Sovereign must only assure the individuals’ 
trust in one another to establish society.”115 
The first thing the Sovereign does is create a channel of communication that makes each 
agent’s intentions accessible to every other player in the game. This Opponent Learning 
Awareness mechanism mitigates the mistrust and uncertainty surrounding intentions by shaping 
the anticipated learning of other agents in the environment. It modifies the learning rule to 
include an additional term ∆𝑡
𝑖  that accounts for the impact of agent 𝑖’s learning update on the 
                                                      
113 Id at XIV. 92. 
114 Supra, Moehler at 300. 
115 Id at 311. 
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anticipated parameter update of the other agents. That term is the update from the Bellman 
equation: 
𝑄𝑖(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡)  ← (1 − 𝛼)𝑄𝑖(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) + ∆𝑡
𝑖   
∆𝑡
𝑖  = 𝛼(𝑟𝑡 +  𝛾 ∙  max
𝑎
𝑄𝑖(𝑠𝑡+1, 𝑎𝑡)) 
Every time 𝑄𝑖(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡) gets updated on move 𝑚 = 𝑖, we also update every other player’s Q-table 
with ∆𝑡
𝑖 . If, for example, a player 𝑖 chooses to take the defer action (i.e. cooperate and enter 
political society) in state 𝑠𝑡 and earns some reward 𝑟𝑡, which might be positive or negative, then 
the Sovereign enables every other agent to learn by applying the same update term ∆𝑡
𝑖  in 𝑠𝑡 but 
putting them “in the shoes” of player 𝑖 by adjusting the current move 𝑠𝑡,𝑚 and the invasion store 
𝑠𝑡,𝑖 to reflect an alternate reality in which the other agent is the one deciding to take an action in 
the state.  
In other words, OLA induces a sort of “empathy” in which, on every player’s turn, all 
other players can “imagine” what it might be like to be in that situation and take that action, and 
their proclivity towards or away from the action is adjusted in the same direction as the player 
who actually does take the action. This mechanism is an internal feature of learning agents 
themselves, not an adjustment in the framework of the game or social dilemma. Formally, it 
modifies each player’s Q-value update to adjust at every time step 𝑡 and every move 𝑚, rather 
than just on its turn 𝑠𝑡,𝑚 = 𝑚 = 𝑖 for player 𝑖, and gives us the new update equation: 
𝑄𝑖(𝑠𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑎𝑡)  ←  (1 − 𝛼)𝑄𝑖(𝑠𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑎𝑡) + ∆𝑡
𝑚   for 𝑖 ∈ [0, 1, …𝑝 − 1] 
Where ∆𝑡
𝑚 is the learning update for the player whose move it currently is and  
𝑠𝑡
𝑖 = 〈𝑆𝑊𝐴𝑃(?⃑?𝑡 , 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋(?⃑?𝑡 , 𝑃𝑖), 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋(?⃑?𝑡 , 𝑃𝑚)), 𝑆𝑊𝐴𝑃(?⃑⃑?𝑡 , 𝑖, 𝑚𝑡),𝑚𝑡 = 𝑖〉 
𝑆𝑊𝐴𝑃(?⃑?, 𝑖, 𝑖′) = {?⃑?| 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖′ , 𝑣𝑖′ = 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝} 
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is the “alternate reality” state where player 𝑖 is put in the place of player 𝑚 by swapping board 
locations, invasion states, and current move.  
As another consequence of this new OLA update, every player performs a Q-update 
every turn, rather than as before, each player performing its update only every 𝑝 turns. With this 
Hobbesian learning awareness mechanism built in, we should expect to see faster and steadier 
convergence to equilibrium policies across all players by increasing the frequency of learning 
and sharing those updates. It can still be the case that the equilibrium converged to may be a low 
payoff one, (i.e. mutual defection) so in order to reach the high payoff equilibrium, we need a 
further mechanism to ensure that the policy convergence for agents goes toward cooperation.  
 
Majoritarian Voting 
 The only way to escape this State of Nature for Hobbes, is to form a political union under 
a Sovereign with sufficient instruments and power to shape the policy of individual agents. To 
erect this Commonwealth is “to confer all their power and strength upon one Man;” an act which 
“is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unity of them all.” This action is “the Generation 
of that great Leviathan, or rather of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, 
our peace and defense.”116 Practically, how does this political society come about? In the 
Hobbesian account, after a while, agents come to recognize the frustrating predicament in which 
they are stuck and, as we see in the Civilization game, rewards are consistently negative. What is 
required is to offer players a vote in order for them to signal to others their desire, whether to 
remain in or to escape the State of Nature. After the final tally, “if the representative consist of 
many men, the voice of the greater number, must be considered as the voice of them all.”117 Each 
                                                      
116 Supra, Leviathan at XVII. 120. 
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agent votes to “authorize and give up my Right of Governing myself to this [Sovereign], on this 
condition, that thou give up thy Right to him and authorize all his Actions in like manner.”118 If a 
majority of agents vote to “defer” their right to choose their own action in favor of the 
Sovereign’s choice, then for Hobbes, that vote is binding on all players since the threat of 
preemptive invasion disappears. “In a civil state, where there is a Power set up to constrain those 
that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable, and for that cause, he 
which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.”119 With the Sovereign in power 
through that vote, invasion becomes sine jure because the Right of Nature no longer exists, and 
consequently the Sovereign enforces the social law that no player may enter another player’s 
territory on its turn, but rather should stay on its own property and farm it, which leads to 
positive long-term payoff equilibrium. As Hobbes puts it, “the Sovereign assigns to every man a 
portion according as he, and not according as any Subject or number of them, shall judge 
agreeable to Equity and the Common Good.”120  
 The Majoritarian Vote mechanism lowers the threshold of the number of agents disposed 
to cooperative action to achieve system-wide cooperation and once reached, universalizes that 
policy by making it binding on non-cooperative agents. Instead of allowing a single invading 
player to upset the cooperative equilibrium, a simple majority vote can commit all other players 
to take the “defer” action, and once players become habituated in this way to choosing to 
cooperate, they learn from the reward feedback that the policy is good for them in the long run. 
Formally, we adjust the Civilization Game dynamics to account for a new potential action 
“defer” that, with a simple majority vote every 𝑝 turns, commits all players to taking the “defer” 
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action. The new action set is 𝑎𝑡 ∈ [𝑢𝑝, 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛, 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡, 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦, 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟] and we increment the 
number of possible moves to 𝑚 ∈ [0, 1, …𝑝], making move 𝑚 = 𝑝 the period where all 𝑝 agents 
take the Majoritarian Vote for whether to institute the Sovereign. The Hobbesian transition 
function becomes piecewise based upon the current move: 
𝑇𝐻(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) = {
𝑇𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) 𝑠𝑡,𝑚 = 𝑝
 𝑇(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡)           𝑠𝑡,𝑚 ≠ 𝑝 
 
Where 𝑇(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) is the standard transition function from the standard Q-Learning model and the 
voting procedure is described by: 
𝑇𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) = {
               𝑠𝑡                             𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(?⃑?𝑡) > 𝑝/2
〈𝑠𝑡,𝑏 , 𝑠𝑡,𝑛 , 𝑠𝑡,𝑚 = 0〉            𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(?⃑?𝑡) ≤ 𝑝/2
 
The function to count votes is given by 𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(?⃑?𝑡) =  ∑ [𝑎𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟]𝑝−1𝑖=0 . A successful vote 
simply forces each player to take the “defer” action by setting 𝐴(𝑠𝑡) = [𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟] until the next 
vote at 𝑡′ = 𝑡 + 𝑝, not moving from their current board location since 𝑇(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟) = 𝑠𝑡, and 
thus changing nothing about the state except taking 𝑝 turns. A failed vote simply advances the 
move to player 𝑖 = 0 but with 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 ∉ 𝐴(𝑠𝑡) for all players until the next vote at 𝑡
′. The reward 
each player accrues by playing “defer” after a successful vote is simply the farming bonus 
proportional to the amount of territory held 𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟) = 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑏). As long as a majority 
of agents choose to defer to the Sovereign, we should see an improved convergence to 
cooperation in the MAS playing the Civilization Game. 
Sovereign Reward-shaping 
 With OLA, we have an intra-agent mechanism for modifying the way that agents learn 
and share their intentions leading to faster and more stable convergence while with Majoritarian 
Voting, we’ve introduced a modification in the game environment that pushes players towards 
the high payoff equilibrium. In the Hobbesian narrative, we’re halfway to the state of society: 
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individuals who are empowered to overcome their mutual Diffidence subsequently elect, by 
common assent, a single authority to whom they defer their actions. What remains is to 
institutionalize the behavior of this Sovereign and determine, from the Hobbesian perspective, 
how it conduces to the security and benefit of political society. Famously, Hobbes believed that 
the Sovereign exercised absolute power over its subjects and no policy it executed could be 
considered unjust. Even so, he still held that a good Sovereign knew that its own majesty and 
dominion went hand-in-hand with the flourishing of the state, for “the Nutrition of a 
Commonwealth consists in the Plenty and Distribution of Materials conducing to Life.”121 To 
this end, this primary prerogative is committed to the Sovereign: “the Power of Rewarding with 
riches, or honor; and of Punishing with corporal, or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy 
every Subject according… as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve 
the Commonwealth, or deterring of them from doing disservice to the same.”122 The institution 
of reward for players when they choose to defer to the Sovereign and penalty when they defect is 
the last component in the Hobbesian political prescription and requires modifying the 
Civilization Game. 
 In particular, after every 𝑝 turns, if the Majoritarian Vote succeeds, or 𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(?⃑?𝑡) > 𝑝/2, 
then every player receives a 10 point bonus and performs a Q-update for taking the 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 action 
in that state. Even players who didn’t vote 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 still receive the bonus and perform the update 
as if they had voted to cooperate. If the Vote fails, then only those players who did vote to 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 
receive a -10-point penalty in line with the Hobbesian and Assurance game view that those who 
attempt to lay down their arms while others choose to invade, suffer terrible consequences. 
Stated formally, we add a new integer component to the game state, 𝑟 ∈ [−1, 1], that represents 
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whether we should apply the Sovereign reward or penalty to players after a vote. The new game 
state is then: 
𝑠𝑡 = 〈?⃑?𝑡 , ?⃑⃑?𝑡 ,𝑚𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡〉 
And the transition vote function 𝑇𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 only is modified to reflect the new state, since it is the 
only function that touches the new state component, not the overall Hobbesian transition 𝑇𝐻 or 
the standard transition 𝑇: 
𝑇𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) = {
     〈𝑠𝑡,𝑏, 𝑠𝑡,𝑛, 𝑠𝑡,𝑚 , 𝑠𝑡,𝑟 = 1〉          𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(?⃑?𝑡) > 𝑝/2
〈𝑠𝑡,𝑏, 𝑠𝑡,𝑛, 𝑠𝑡,𝑚 = 0, 𝑠𝑡,𝑚 = −1〉   𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(?⃑?𝑡) ≤ 𝑝/2
 
The reward function is also adjusted to account for the Sovereign’s reward/punishment 
𝑅𝑖
𝑆(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) function: 
𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) =  {
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑏) + 10 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑏, 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑖) − 25 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑛) 𝑠𝑚 = 𝑖
                                                       𝑅𝑖
𝑆(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡)                                           𝑠𝑚 = 𝑝
                                                           0                                                      𝑜/𝑤
 
Where the Sovereign reward function is given by: 
𝑅𝑖
𝑆(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡) = {
     10𝑠𝑡,𝑟           𝑎𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟
max (10𝑠𝑡,𝑟 , 0) 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 ≠ 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟  
 
Finally, we utilize the same Q-update equation from OLA, but add the additional voting move 
𝑚 = 𝑝 to 𝑖 ∈ [0, 1,… 𝑝] with the further Sovereign reward from 𝑅𝑝
𝑆(𝑠𝑡 , ?⃑?𝑡).  
 These three mechanisms, then, Opponent Learning Awareness, Majoritarian Voting, and 
Sovereign Reward-shaping form the backbone for a Hobbesian strategy for overcoming 
defection and entering and preserving the state of society. For Hobbes, each one is closely 
related to the others in this narrative and without all of them, we theoretically lose either the 
stability, speed, or direction of joint policy convergence for the MAS. Consequently, the HQ-
Learning agent proposed will be deployed experimentally with a single, comprehensive toolkit.   
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III. Results 
Q-Learning versus Hobbesian Q-Learning 
 Having seen the problems that independent multi-agent reinforcement learning faces in 
overcoming the low payoff equilibrium to achieve the high payoff long-term cooperative policy 
and shown their similarity to the ones faced in the Hobbesian State of Nature, I have proposed 
that the three aforementioned political mechanisms offered by Hobbes should also be applicable 
solutions in MAS. The problem of mistrust and the ever-present fear of being invaded is 
mitigated by making each agent aware of its opponents’ learning and using that to align all 
agents’ policies. The next step is to lower the barrier for system-wide joint cooperation by means 
of making a majority vote for cooperative action binding on all agents in the game, thus also 
teaching the disruptive players about the benefits of cooperation. Finally, reward-shaping by the 
Sovereign ensures that when votes succeed, a central figure has authority to reward cooperation 
and punish defection.    
In order to compare the performance of simple Q-Learning and Hobbesian Q-Learning, 
which is Q-Learning with the aforementioned Hobbesian mechanisms for shaping game and 
learning dynamics, the Civilization Game is played with 𝑏 = 4 and 𝑝 = 4 with an invasion 
bonus of 10 points and invasion penalty of -25 points as the experimental standard. The value 
iteration update parameters used are the discount factor 𝛾 = 0.99, the soft update parameter 𝑎 =
0.5, and the annealing discovery parameter 𝜀𝑡 = 0.9 × 0.9999
𝑡 . Majoritarian Voting activates 
the 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 action with a strict majority 𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸(?⃑?𝑡) > 𝑝/2 and the Sovereign rewards 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 with 
a 15 point incentive while players who get duped (i.e. vote for 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 while other players decide 
to defect) incur a -10 point hit.  
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Learning Curves 
 
Figure 7: Collective rewards for all 𝑝 = 4 players every 𝑏𝑖𝑛 = 2500 steps for 𝑇 = 250𝑘 steps. 
Error bars indicate the results of running the game 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 3 times with the median line 
displayed. Score is a function of 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑏), 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑏 , 𝑎𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑖), and 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑛). 
 The first point of comparison is the collective score earned over time. With a sample rate 
of 0.01 and 𝑇 = 250𝑘 game steps, we get a bin size of 𝑏𝑖𝑛 = 2500. Collective Score earned 
starting at game step 𝑡 is then defined as  
𝐶𝑆𝑡,𝑏𝑖𝑛
𝐵 = ∑ ∑𝑟𝑖
𝑎
𝑝
𝑎=0
𝑡+𝑏𝑖𝑛
𝑖=𝑡
 
where 𝑟𝑖
𝑎 is the reward earned by agent 𝑎 at time 𝑖. Random play consistently incurs negative 
reward and acts as the base comparison. The rewards available to Q-Learning and Hobbesian Q-
Learning are made equal even though the learning remains distinct in order to make a fair apples-
to-apples comparison. Specifically, the rewards that the Sovereign provides apply to Q-Learners 
if a majority decide to take the 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 action, but unlike HQ-Learning, that reward does not 
cause a Q-update. As we can see from Figure 7, the scores earned by Q-Learning players every 
𝑏𝑖𝑛 steps do improve over time, even jumping into positive territory a handful of times, but 
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learning is slow and sporadic as expected. For HQ-Learning, on the other hand, we see consistent 
and fast convergence to the high payoff equilibrium. The reward growth demonstrated in the 
learning curve is a dramatic improvement over independent reinforcement learning, but we still 
want to examine the policy underlying this performance improvement.  
 
Figure 8: Collective invasions for all 𝑝 = 4 players every 𝑏𝑖𝑛 = 2500 steps for 𝑇 = 250𝑘 steps. 
Error bars indicate the results of running the game 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 3 times with the median line 
displayed. Invasions measured by tracking changes to the game state ?⃑⃑?𝑡. 
For any compelling case of cooperation in the Civilization Game, we should see 
that agents learn to stop invading one another. With the same game parameters and bin 
size of 𝑏𝑖𝑛 = 2500, we see that collective invasions drop off dramatically for HQ-
Learning, converging to 0 invasions per 𝑏𝑖𝑛 steps. Collective Invasions starting at game 
step 𝑡 is measured every 𝑝 turns at times 𝐸𝑡 ∈ [𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑝, …  𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖𝑛] as  
𝐶𝐼𝑡,𝑏𝑖𝑛
𝐵 = ∑∑[𝑛𝑖
𝑎 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒]
𝑝
𝑎=0𝑖∈𝐸𝑡
 
where 𝑛𝑖
𝑎 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 if agent 𝑎 has been invaded at time 𝑖. As expected, invasions roughly 
inversely follow game score because of the invasion penalty that detracts from the score. 
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Even so, if agents are invading one another less often in HQ-Learning than standard Q-
Learning, they must be taking some other action instead. 
 
Figure 9: Collective successful defer votes for all 𝑝 = 4 players every 𝑏𝑖𝑛 = 2500 steps for 𝑇 =
250𝑘 steps. Error bars indicate the results of running the game 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 3 times with the median 
line displayed. Successful votes measured by tracking the game state when 𝑟𝑡 = 1. 
The other metric that shows that agents have learned to cooperate in the 
Civilization Game is the number of successful votes where more than half of agents 
choose to defer their actions to the Sovereign. Formally, collective successful defers is 
measured every 𝑝 turns at time 𝐸𝑡 ∈ [𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑝, …  𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖𝑛] by: 
𝑆𝐷𝑡,𝑏𝑖𝑛
𝐵 = ∑[𝑠𝑡,𝑟 = 1]
𝑖∈𝐸𝑡
 
Just as in the collective score and invasions over time, Q-Learning learns to vote 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 
only inconsistently while HQ-Learning learns the cooperative policy stably, because of 
the alignment of agent learning with OLA, and quickly, because of the Sovereign reward-
shaping. OLA is especially important here because only cooperative action by 𝑝/2 agents 
at any time 𝑡 ∈ 𝐸𝑡 is needed to induce a learning step for defecting agents that increases 
the Q-value of deferring at state 𝑠𝑡. With more and more successful votes, defectors will 
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eventually discover that cooperating is more beneficial, even without necessarily having 
taken the 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 action. 
Policies 
 
Figure 10: Breakdown of actions played by Q-Learning player 𝑖 = 0 every 𝑏𝑖𝑛 = 2500 game 
steps. The policy choice apparently fails to converge, with significant variance in the number of 
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 actions taken. Note that the 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦 action is only legal when the other four cardinal 
directions are not. 
 
Figure 11: Breakdown of actions played by HQ-Learning player 𝑖 = 0 every 𝑏𝑖𝑛 = 2500 game 
steps. This player gradually learns the value of rejecting short-term incentives to navigate and 
invade in favor of deferring to the Sovereign. 
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Lastly, to verify that the policy agents are learning is in fact to choose the 
Sovereign and political society rather than pursuing their own independent actions, we 
drop below the collective metrics and analyze the actions of a single agent playing the 
Civilization Game, arbitrarily chosen from the 4 players. Q-Learning vacillates between 
the high and low payoff equilibria as we anneal 𝜀 over time while HQ-Learning learns to 
achieve the long-term cooperation policy by reliably deferring to the Sovereign. 
 
Matrix Game Analysis 
We can also perform an analysis to determine what kind of matrix game the Civilization 
Game SSD would translate into by playing agents with cooperative policies against agents who 
have learned to defect. As is the case for matrix games, Markov games like the Civilization 
Game become social dilemmas when the payoff outcomes 𝑅, 𝑃, 𝑆 and 𝑇 defined below satisfy the 
social dilemma inequalities. These outcomes are derived from: 
𝑅(𝑠) ∶=  𝑉1
𝜋𝐶,𝜋𝐶(𝑠) =  𝑉2
𝜋𝐶,𝜋𝐶(𝑠) 
𝑃(𝑠) ∶=  𝑉1
𝜋𝐷,𝜋𝐷(𝑠) =  𝑉2
𝜋𝐷,𝜋𝐷(𝑠) 
𝑆(𝑠) ∶=  𝑉1
𝜋𝐶,𝜋𝐷(𝑠) =  𝑉2
𝜋𝐷,𝜋𝐶(𝑠) 
𝑇(𝑠) ∶=  𝑉1
𝜋𝐷,𝜋𝐶(𝑠) =  𝑉2
𝜋𝐶,𝜋𝐷(𝑠) 
Where 𝜋𝐶 and 𝜋𝐷are cooperative and defecting policies respectively. The long-term payoff 𝑉 for 
player 𝑖 when the joint policy ?⃑? = (𝜋1, 𝜋2) is followed from an initial state 𝑠0 is: 
𝑉𝑖
?⃑? (𝑠0) =  Ε?⃑? 𝑡∽?⃑? (𝑂(𝑠𝑡)), 𝑠𝑡+1∽𝑇(𝑠𝑡, ?⃑? 𝑡) [∑𝛾
𝑡 𝑟𝑖(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎 𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0
] 
with the temporal discount factor 𝛾 ∈ [0,1]. The social dilemma inequalities as previously 
defined are 𝑅 >  𝑃 (mutual cooperation is preferred to mutual defection), 𝑅 >  𝑆 (mutual 
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cooperation is preferred to being exploited by a defector), 2𝑅 >  𝑇 +  𝑆 (mutual cooperation is 
preferred to an equal probability of unilateral cooperation and defection), and either greed 𝑇 >
 𝑅 or fear 𝑃 >  𝑆 (mutual defection is preferred over being exploited). 
As discussed in the SSD section, we can define what a cooperation versus defection 
policy is by thresholding a continuous social behavior metric 𝛼 ∶  Π →  ℝ with values 𝛼𝑐 and 𝛼𝑑 
such that 𝛼(𝜋) < 𝛼𝑐  ↔  𝜋 ∈  Π
𝐶 and 𝛼(𝜋) >  𝛼𝑑  ↔  𝜋 ∈  Π
𝐷 . An obvious candidate for this 
metric would be invasions per hundred moves; if we set the threshold to 𝛼𝑐 = 5 and 𝛼𝑑 =  15, 
then plugging in the Q-Learning and HQ-Learning policies learned after 𝑇 = 250𝑘 steps, 𝜋𝑄 and 
𝜋𝐻𝑄 , we have 𝜋𝑄 ∈  Π𝐷 and 𝜋𝐻𝑄 ∈  Π𝐶. Having shown that the standard Q-Learning policy is a 
defecting policy and the HQ-Learning policy is cooperative, we can now play pairs of these 
policies against one another and calculate the long-term payoff 𝑉 and thus the matrix payoff 
values. For example, we can find the mutual cooperation payoff 𝑅 = 𝑉0
𝜋𝐶,𝜋𝐶(𝑠0) by playing two 
HQ-Learning agents against one another. With 𝑇 = 100𝑘 game steps and the same game 
dynamics and payoffs as before, we get the payoff matrix: 
 
Figure 12: The Civilization Game SSD matrix game with long-term payoff  𝑉𝑖
?⃑⃑? (𝑠0) divided by 
𝑇 = 100𝑘. These values characterize the embedded MGSD within the Game. 
In this run, by calculating 𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 𝑃 − 𝑆 = 0.029 and 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑 = 𝑇 − 𝑅 = −0.013, we see that 
the Civilization Game, and, to the degree that it conceptually resembles it, the Hobbesian State of 
Nature, is a Stag Hunt MGSD. However, the matrix payoffs change each trial run because of the 
existence of stochasticity in the discovery parameter, 𝜀. The parameter is retained in order to 
prevent play from being “stuck” in a single state-action cycle, somewhat in the spirit of the 
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trembling hand perfect equilibrium123 that also accounts for some randomness. Consequently, 15 
trials are run to calculate different payoff matrices.  
 
Figure 13: Civilization matrix game analysis with 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 15 runs where each run consists of 
three match-ups: HQL vs HQL, HQL vs QL, and QL vs QL with 𝑇 = 100𝑘 steps. The resulting 
𝑉𝑖
?⃑⃑? (𝑠) long-term payoff values are divided by 𝑇 for scale, then used to calculate 𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑟 and 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑. 
The results for the greed and fear calculations differ by around 5% and two-thirds of runs end up 
as Stag Hunts. The fact that almost all runs have at least some fear factor while only one-third 
have a positive greed factor can be seen in the game reward structure: players are only rewarded 
10 points for an invasion while being invaded incurs a -25-point penalty that is over twice as 
large. In addition, the existence of alternative channels for reward (i.e. farming and deferral 
bonuses) means that an invasion penalty only consists of about a third of the maximum possible 
reward on a given turn. 
   
 
 
                                                      
123 Bielefeld, R. S. A Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. 1975. 
25–55. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Discussion 
The central goal of this thesis has been to offer a new, interdisciplinary solution to the 
problems involved in producing cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning by looking to 
the way in which humans learn to cooperate in political society in the presence of incentives to 
defect. After implementing a new SSD and learning mechanisms inspired by that comparison, 
we see a surprisingly large improvement in game performance and convergence to a joint 
cooperative policy when compared to standard learning algorithms. Individually, there has been 
theoretical work in the field of MAS proposing frameworks similar to opponent learning 
awareness124, learning sharing125, reward shaping126, and voting127, but approaching the problem 
from a Hobbesian perspective merges and motivates them in a way that produces real 
experimental results. Specifically, the addition of an opponent learning awareness term ∆𝑡
𝑖  to 
each player’s Q-update helps share information about how the behavioral intentions of other 
players changes and enables stable policy convergence. Secondly, the institution of a binding 
majoritarian voting procedure reduces the threshold of cooperative players needed to achieve a 
joint cooperative policy and thus increases the speed of convergence. Finally, when agents 
successfully vote to defer their actions, the Sovereign is empowered to disburse reward and 
punishment in a way that shapes the learning of defecting players. 
The interdisciplinary application of solutions from Hobbesian political philosophy to the 
problem of cooperation in MAS is also unprecedented. While some philosophers interested in a 
computational theory of mind have seen connections to Hobbes’s comment that “when a man 
                                                      
124 Supra, Foerster. 
125 Hwang, K. S. Model Learning and Knowledge Sharing for a Multiagent System with Dyna-Q Learning. 2015. 
126 Grzes, Marek. Reward Shaping in Episodic Reinforcement Learning. 2017. 
127 Pitt, Jeremy. Voting in Multi-Agent Systems. 2005. 
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reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a 
remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another,”128 no attempt has been made to 
instantiate his insights in an experimental setting. In order to motivate that application, I’ve also 
offered a new argument that applies Hobbes’s natural and moral philosophy, specifically his 
materialist, determinist, morally subjectivist, rationally self-interested, individualist, and 
egalitarian understanding of human nature, to artificially intelligent agents. This falls in line 
with, although certainly doesn’t justify, Haugeland’s dramatic assertion that Hobbes was 
“prophetically launching Artificial Intelligence”129 when he published Leviathan. The argument 
raises questions about the degree to which AI agents and humans share the same nature and 
where differences might lie. Importantly, Hobbes also emphasizes the significance of the 
passions like vainglory, contempt, courage, and benevolence that don’t fit neatly into existing 
computational frameworks.130 This is certainly an exception to the otherwise striking 
comparison, but I will note that, for Hobbes, the passions are merely components of a 
psychology that is still materialist and completely determined by sense perception. 
Consequently, there is theoretically no reason why they couldn’t be incorporated into a learning 
agent’s computational decision process. 
 The Civilization Game SSD introduced in this thesis also offers a new blend of incentives 
and punishment meant to reflect the social dynamics that exist in the State of Nature and a 
unique opportunity to test Hobbes’s philosophical framework. This experimental analysis 
contributes to contemporary Hobbes scholarship that understands it as a Stag Hunt, otherwise 
known as the Assurance Game. Moehler famously claimed that: “the situation of prudent 
                                                      
128 Supra, Leviathan at V. 
129 Haugeland, J. Artificial intelligence: the very idea. 1985. 23. 
130 Supra, Leviathan at VI. 
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individuals in Hobbes’ State of Nature is best modeled by an assurance game, [because] the 
highest payoff for her is not achieved by unilateral defection, as suggested by the one-shot 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, but by mutual cooperation.”131 Skyrms also argued that if the 
shortsighted Foole were to consider the ‘shadow of the future’ in a repeated game, the alleged 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game would be transformed into an assurance game.132 Gauthier, also, 
believes that the adequate long-term representation of the game that rational individuals play in 
Hobbes’ State of Nature is an assurance game, although he does not call the game by its name.133 
Fascinatingly, however, we can see from this thesis that it isn’t always or necessarily an 
Assurance Game, but rather, depending on the way one adjusts the ratio between how tempting 
the invasion bonus is and how painful the invasion penalty is, the game might transform into a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma instead.  
Importantly, the matrix game analysis presented here is the first attempt, to my 
knowledge, to go beyond a close exegesis of Hobbes to an SSD analysis of the game-theoretic 
dynamics of the State of Nature. While scholars have studied Hobbes quantitatively via an 
iterated matrix game analysis134, those investigations do not account for the fact that 1) the 
complexity of implementing cooperative versus defecting policies may be unequal, 2) 
successfully implementing a policy often requires solving coordination sub-problems, and 3) 
cooperativeness is a gradated quantity, not an atomic choice of action. Utilizing the Civilization 
Game SSD enables us to understand how agents in a realistic setting learn to choose and 
implement policies, and with the help of Hobbesian mechanisms, achieve a cooperative 
equilibrium. 
                                                      
131 Supra, Moehler at 315. 
132 Supra, Skyrms at 1-13. 
133 Gauthier, D. The Logic of Leviathan. 85–86. 
134 Palumbo, A. Playing Hobbes: The Theory of Games and Hobbesian Political Theory. 1996. 
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Future Work 
 This thesis illustrates the promising practical value of combining knowledge from the 
fields of computer science and political philosophy in understanding the evolution of cooperation 
and lays out some of the experimental groundwork to make that possible. Even so, a great deal 
remains for future work. Within just the bounds of the research question considered here, there 
would be great value in taking the time to implement a more state-of-the-art RL algorithm like 
deep Q-networks that utilize the same theoretical framework as Q-Learning but offers scalability 
to larger state spaces. This would open the door to testing more complicated games with more 
players and a bigger grid-world to explore. The dynamics of an 8 player Civilization Game, for 
example, may look very different from the 4 player and 2 player scenarios tested here.  
There are also additional ideas in Hobbes that could be translated into promising 
mechanisms, like the detailed process for deriving and enforcing binding Covenants between 
different players and between players and the Sovereign. Implementing the Sovereign as a 
separate agent itself instead of a component of the game environment might also allow a 
researcher to analyze its interactions with other players and ask, for example, how good the 
Sovereign must be at punishing defection before the MAS devolves back to the low payoff 
equilibrium. Finally, varying the reward structures within the Civilization Game including the 
farming bonus, invasion bonus, and invasion penalty as well as the Sovereign reward-shaping 
incentives may likely result in different embedded MGSDs and consequently, different learning 
behavior. 
 Although here the three Hobbesian political mechanisms are considered together as a 
unified strategy, further MAS research may analyze the individual merits of each considered 
separately. Whether individually or taken as a whole, it would also be of great interest to observe 
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the performance of modified Hobbesian Q-Learning in other popular SSDs as well like the Wolf 
Pack and Gathering games from Leibo135, or especially the Stag Hunt-inspired Markov games 
like Harvest and Escalation from Peysakhovich and Lerer136. We would expect to see similar 
improvements in performance, especially for those games that preserve high level properties of 
the Stag Hunt. The unique asynchronous turn-based dynamic of the Civilization Game might 
also offer an opportunity to contrast experimentally considerations of player memory length and 
complexity cost required to compute equilibria versus in the standard synchronous model.137 
Generally, my hope is to encourage research in the field of AI or MAS to look beyond traditional 
methodologies and search out interdisciplinary solutions, even in fields as unconventional as 
political philosophy, to interdisciplinary problems. 
 Likewise, scholars of Hobbes, in line with his thoroughly empirical method, have at their 
disposal a powerful new experimental tool that models the State of Nature in many important 
respects, although admittedly simplified in others, and deploys Hobbesian, intelligent agents to 
play that game. By varying the incentive structure in the Civilization Game, we can see how 
varying certain underlying assumptions that Hobbes makes might affect his political conclusions. 
I have already shown that increasing the invasion bonus / invasion penalty ratio transforms the 
embedded MGSD in the Civilization Game from an Assurance game to a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Further research might also examine the consequences of reducing the effectiveness of the 
Sovereign by either reducing the size of the reward or punishment or by making it apply only 
once every 𝑛 times and observing whether agents still learn to cooperate. The results of such an 
experiment might inform our perspective on Hobbes’s infamous position that life under a 
                                                      
135 Supra, Leibo et al. 
136 Supra, Peysakhovich et al. 
137 Bhaskar, V. Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria. 1998. 1. 
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Sovereign, no matter how harsh, is always better than life in the State of Nature. This thesis also 
offers the first argument for the applicability of Hobbes’s natural and moral philosophy to 
modern computational artificial intelligence. The obvious exception that has been highlighted is 
the role of the passions in directing human action that finds no direct corollary in mechanical RL. 
That being said, in Hobbes’s mechanistic materialist psychology, there should almost certainly 
exist a way to mechanize the passions in his account in a way that makes them feasible to model 
or implement in computers.  
 In conclusion, it’s clear that the evolution of cooperation is a fascinating and difficult 
problem of great practical importance for both humans and AI. Hobbes’s own answer profoundly 
influenced the way in which humans organize our modern, liberal societies, and the solutions we 
develop to enable cooperation amongst artificially intelligent agents will similarly affect what 
technology in the 21st century will look like and how it will interface with us. There is good 
reason to be optimistic about a near future in which humans and computers work hand-in-hand to 
solve the biggest challenges we face, and my hope is that the work presented here might 
represent a small contribution to that larger project. 
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